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C. R. Williams* The Problem of Similar Fact
Evidence
Similar fact evidence raises in a particularly acute form the conflict
between two competing principles in the law of evidence. On the
one hand, the principle that evidence of high probative value ought
to be admitted. On the other, the principle that in criminal trials
evidence possessing a significant potential for prejudice ought, in
the interests of fairness, to be excluded.
The expression "similar fact evidence" is here used broadly to
refer to all evidence which shows that on some other occasion the
accused acted in a way more or less similar to the way in which the
prosecution alleges he acted on the occasion which is the subject of
the present charge. Such evidence is, clearly, frequently of great
probative value. Equally, such evidence constitutes the example par
excellence of evidence possessing a potential for prejudice.
The purpose of the present article is to re-examine the English
and Commonwealth case law dealing with the admissibility of
similar fact evidence, with a view to showing the manner in which
these two competing principles interact.
I. The Rule in Makin v. Attorney-General for New South Wales
The starting point for any discussion of the subject of similar fact
evidence must be the decision of the Privy Council in Makin v.
Attorney-General for New South Wales.'
The accused, a husband and wife, were charged with the murder
of a baby. Its body was found buried in their garden, and they were
proved to have agreed to adopt it in return for payment of a small
sum by its parents. The defence of the accused was that the child
had died through natural causes, and that their sole crime was to
have buried it irregularly. The prosecution's case was that the child
had been killed by the Makins pursuant to a scheme by which they
took charge of infants in return for payments to be used for the
infants care; then killed the infants and retained the sums paid. In
support of this case the prosecution led evidence that the bodies of
*B. Juris., LL.B. (Hons.) (Monash), B.C.L. (Oxon.), Barrister-at-Law (Vic.),
Senior Lecturer in Law, Monash University, Formerly Visiting Professor, Osgoode
Hall Law School.
1. [1894]A.C. 57
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twelve other infants had been discovered in the grounds of premises
occupied at various times by the Makins, and that several of these
infants had been placed in the care of the Makins in return for
payment of a small sum. The accused were convicted and appealed
unsuccessfully to the Privy Council. The Privy Council held that the
evidence had been properly admitted to establish that the baby's
death was the result not of natural causes, but of the conduct of the
Makins.
Delivering the judgment of their Lordships, Lord Herschell L.C.
stated:
It is undoubtedly not competent for the prosecution to adduce
evidence tending to shew that the accused has been guilty of
criminal acts other than those covered by the indictment, for the
purpose of leading to the conclusion that the accused is a person
likely from his criminal conduct or character to have committed
the offence for which he is being tried. On the other hand, the
mere fact that the evidence adduced tends to shew the
commission of other crimes does not render it inadmissible if it
be relevant to an issue before the jury, and it may be so relevant if
it bears upon the question whether the acts alleged to constitute
the crime charged in the indictment were designed or accidental,
or to rebut a defence which would otherwise be open to the
accused.
2
This statement has been repeated in most of the subsequent cases
on the subject, and its authority never doubted. In the most recent
decision of the House of Lords dealing with similar fact evidence
3
Lord Morris stated that Lord Herschell's words "have always been
accepted as expressing cardinal principles" 4, and Lord Hailsham
said "I do not know that the matter can be better stated than it was
by Lord Herschell.''5 Lord Salmon expressed himself even more
strongly stating:
The principles upon which such evidence should be admitted or
excluded are stated with crystal clarity in the celebrated passage
from the judgment delivered by Lord Herschell L.C. in Makin v.
Attorney-General for New South Wales [1894] A.C. 57, 65. I
doubt whether the learned analyses and explanations of that
passage to which it has been subjected so often in the last 80
years add very much to it.
6
2. Id. at 65
3. D.P.P. v. Boardman, [1975] A.C. 421; [ 1974] 3 All E.R. 887
4. Id. at 438 [1974] 3 All E.R. at 892
5. Id. at 453 [1974] 3 All E.R. at 905
6. Id. at 461 [197413 All E.R. at912
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However, if Lord Herschell's formulation is examined it will be
seen to contain an internal logical contradiction which would appear
to render it unworkable. 7 The first sentence states a rule of
exculsion. The second sentence states a rule of inclusion, but a rule
of such width as to render the rule of exclusion of no effect. It is not
possible to say that evidence of a particular class is inadmissible,
and then to say that such evidence is admissible "if it be relevant to
an issue before the jury". To be admissible any item of evidence
must be relevant to an issue before the jury. If evidence relevant to
an issue before the jury is to be admissible notwithstanding the
exclusionary rule, then the exclusionary rule is of no effect.
Broadly, three approaches have been adopted to the problem of
giving a workable meaning to Lord Herschell's formulation.
1. A Rule of Exclusion With Exceptions
The first approach is to state that there is a general rule requiring the
exclusion of similar fact evidence. This rule is stated in the first
sentence of Lord Herschell's formulation. To this rule of exclusion
however, there are a number of exceptions. It is to the class of
exceptions that the second sentence of Lord Herschell's formulation
refers. The two exceptions mentioned (cases where the evidence
bears upon the question whether the acts alleged to constitute the
crime charged in the indictment were designed or accidental, and
cases where the evidence rebuts a defence which would otherwise
be open to the accused) were not intended to be exhaustive of the
classes of case where relevant similar fact evidence may be
admitted. It is now recognised that there are other classes of case
where such evidence may be admissible, and further classes may be
developed. 8 The most commonly listed classes of exception are 1)
To Prove Identity, 2) To Prove Knowledge or Intent, 3) To Rebut a
Defence of Mistake or Involuntary Conduct, 4) To Establish
System, 5) To Rebut a Defence of Innocent Association.
Such an understanding of Lord Herschell's formulation has often
7. The two sentences of Lord Herschell's formulation constitute an example of
what Professor Julius Stone has termed "Legal Categories of Competing
Reference." Legal System and Lawyers' Reasoning (Sydney: Maitland Publica-
tions Pty. Ltd., 1964) at 248 - 52
8. Thompson v. The King, [1918] A.C. 221, at 237 (H.L.); Harris v. D.P.P.,
(1952] A.C. 694, at 705 (H.L.); MacDonald v. Canada Kelp Co. Ltd. (1973), 39
D.L.R. (3d) 617 at 625 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Schell and Paquette (1977), 33 C.C.C.
(2d) 422 at 426-7 (Ont. C.A.).
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been adopted by the courts,9 and it is the approach taken in many of
the textbooks on evidence. ' 0 The difficulty with this approach is
that it tends to encourage an overly simplistic view of the question
of the admissibility of similar fact evidence. When faced with a
particular case its adherents often simply ask whether the case fits
neatly within one of the established categories. If it does the
evidence will usually be admitted; if it does not the evidence will
usually be rejected. It is submitted that if such a procedure is
adopted, the true factors which ought to determine whether an item
of similar fact evidence is to be admitted or rejected are being
largely ignored.
2. Relevance Via Propensity and Relevance Other than Via
Propensity.
This second approach treats as crucial the distinction between
evidence which is relevant only as establishing a propensity or
disposition on the part of the accused to commit acts similar in
nature to those acts constituting the subject matter of the crime
charged, and evidence which possesses a relevance other than by
establishing such a propensity or disposition. The words
"propensity" and "disposition" are here treated as equivalents. If
the evidence is relevant only via propensity it is excluded by the first
sentence of Lord Herschell's formulation. If the evidence possesses
9. E. g. R. v. Bond, [1906] 2 K.B. 389 at 398, 414 (C.A.); Harris v. D.P.P.,
[1952] A.C. 694(H.L.); R. v. Horwood, [1969] 3 All E.R. 1156, at 1158.
10. Phipson on Evidence (12th ed. London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1976) Ch. 11;
P.K. McWilliams, Canadian Criminal Evidence (Canada Law Book Limited,
1974) Ch. 11; McCormick on Evidence (2nd. ed. St. Paul: West Publishing Co.,
1972) at 447-54; J. A. Gobbo, Cross on Evidence (Australian ed. Sydney:
Butterworths, 1970) at 369-411; Rupert Cross, Evidence (3rd ed. London:
Butterworths, 1967) at 292-324. In the fourth edition of his book Professor Cross
has altered the emphasis of his approach, see infra, note 21.
This was in substance the approach taken by the Canadian Law Reform
Commission in drafting the proposed federal Evidence Code. Section 17(1)
provides:
In criminal proceedings, evidence tendered by the prosecution of a trait of
character of the accused that is relevant solely to the disposition of the accused
to act or fail to act in a particular manner is inadmissible .....
Section 18 provides:
Nothing in section 17 prohibits the admission of evidence that a person
committed a crime, civil wrong or other act when relevant to prove some fact
other than his disposition to commit such act, such as evidence to prove absence
of mistake or accident, motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge or identity.
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a relevance other than via propensity it is admissible as falling
within the second sentence of Lord Herschell's formulation.
11
If the evidence possesses a relevance other than via propensity it
is admissible notwithstanding the fact that it also possesses a
relevance via propensity. Indeed, by definition similar fact evidence
will always possess some relevance via propensity. In this context
what Wigmore termed the doctrine of "multiple admissibility" is
applicable. He wrote:
. . . when an evidentiary fact is offered for one purpose, and
becomes admissible by satisfying all the rules applicable to it in
that capacity, it is not indadmissible because it does not satisfy
the rules applicable to it in some other capacity and because the
jury might improperly consider it in the latter capacity. 
12
It is only if the evidence possesses no substantial relevance other
than via propensity that it is inadmissible as falling within the first
limb of Lord Herschell's formulation.
The expressions "relevance via propensity" and "relevance
other than via propensity" require explanation. Assume that the
accused is charged with burglary. Evidence that the accused on
some previous occasion broke into another house is, without more,
inadmissible. It is inadmissible because it shows no more than that
the accused has a propensity for dishonesty, or, at most, a
propensity for burglary. Assume however that at the scene of the
second burglary an article left by the burglar is found. Assume
further, that it is established that this article was taken from the first
house which was burgled. When the facts are changed in this way,
evidence that the accused committed the first burglary beconies
relevant in a quite different way to show he committed the second
burglary. The evidence now possesses a relevance other than via
propensity. The evidence is relevant in the same sort of way as
evidence that a wallet honestly acquired and belonging to the
accused was discovered at the scene of the second burglary.
The evidence does, of course, still possess a relevance via
propensity; it tends to show that the accused has a propensity for
burglary. This latter relevance may constitute a reason for its
exclusion by the trial judge in the exercise of his discretion. Because
11. This distinction forms the basis of many academic accounts of the similar fact
rule. See in particular Julius Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact
Evidence: England (1933), 46 Harv. L.R. 954; Wigmore on Evidence (3rd. ed.
Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1940) Volume 1 at 710-22
12. Wigmore on Evidence, id. at 300
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of the risk that prejudicial evidence may be admissible as possessing
some slight relevance other than via propensity, proponents of this
interpretation of Lord Herschell's formulation place considerable
emphasis on the discretion which, in English law at least, the trial
judge has to reject legally admissible evidence. 
13
The difficulty with an approach based upon the distinction
between relevance via propensity and other relevance, is that in
many cases undoubtedly admissible similar fact evidence derives its
only relevance from an argument via propensity. A particularly
clear illustration is the case of R. v. Straffen. 14 The accused was
charged with the murder by manual strangulation of two little girls
at Bath. He was found unfit to plead by reason of insanity, and
committed to Broadmoor Institution. A year later the accused
escaped, and was at liberty for a period of approximately four
hours. During the period the accused was at large a small girl, Linda
Bowyer, was murdered by strangulation. The accused was seen near
the place where the body was found, but there were other passers-by
who might have committed the crime. When questioned by the
police the accused admitted killing the two girls at Bath, but denied
he was responsible for the murder of Linda Bowyer.
The accused was tried for the murder of Linda Bowyer. The trial
judge admitted evidence of the statements made by the accused to
the police, and also evidence of the circumstances surrounding the
killing of the little girls at Bath. The following points of similarity
existed between the two earlier killings and the killing of Linda
Bowyer: 1) in each case the victim was a young girl, 2) each of the
children was killed by manual stangulation, 3) in no case was there
any attempt at sexual interference or any apparent motive for the
crime, 4) in none of the cases was there any evidence of a struggle,
and 5) in no case was any attempt made to conceal the body
although that could easily have been done.
The accused was convicted, and appealed to the Court of
Criminal Appeal. The Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the
similar fact evidence had been properly admitted. Delivering the
judgment of the Court Slade J. stated:
In the opinion of the court that evidence was rightly admitted, not
for the purpose of showing . . . that the appellant was "a
professional strangler", but to show that he strangled Linda
Bowyer; in other words, for the purpose of identifying the
13. See discussion p. 286 infra
14. [1952] 2 Q.B. 911; [1952] 2 All E.R. 657
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murderer of Linda Bowyer as being the same individual as the
person who had murdered the other two little girls in precisely the
same way. 15
Clearly the decision of the Court was correct. The evidence was
of the highest possible probative value, and it would have been
absurd to have held it inadmissible. The sole relevance of the
evidence was, however, via propensity. The similar fact evidence
established that the accused possessed a propensity of the most
unusual kind; he was a strangler of small girls, in peculiar
circumstances, and for no apparent motive. The unusual nature of
the propensity gave the evidence its great probative value and
rendered it admissible.
R. v. Straffen is in no way highly unusual in this regard. In many
cases the only relevance of undoubtedly admissible similar fact
evidence is by virtue of an argument via propensity. 16
A modified form of the present approach recognises that there
are many cases where evidence relevant solely via propensity is
admissible, but nonetheless insists on the importance of the
distinction. Those adopting this approach maintain that evidence
relevant solely via propensity is prima facie inadmissible, but may
be admissible if it is of exceptional probative value. This argument
was elaborated in an influential essay in Cowen and Carter's,
Essays on the Law of Evidence. 17 The authors summarised the
position regarding the admissibility of similar fact evidence as
follows:
Rule 1. Evidence of similar facts which is relevant primarily via
propensity is inadmissible unless it is exceptional.
Rule 2. Such evidence is exceptional and therefore admissible
provided:
(i) it has very great real probative value upon any issue upon
which the jury is likely to use it; and
15. Id. at 916 [1952] 2 All E.R. at 662
16. Other leading cases in which the similar fact evidence was relevant solely via
propensity include R. v. Ball, [1911] A.C. 47 (H.L.); Thompson v. The King,
[1918] A.C. 221 (H.L.); O'Leary v. The King (1946), 73 C.L.R. 402 (H.C.,
Aust.); R. v. Drysdale, [1969] 2 C.C.C. 141, 66 W.W.R. 664 (Man. C.A.); R. v.
Morris (1969), 54 Cr.App.Rep. 69 (C.C.A.); R. v. Bird, [1970]3 C.C.C. 340, 71
W.W.R. 256 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. McDonald (1974), 20 C.C.C. (2d) 144 (O.C.A.);
D.P.P. v. Boardman, [1975] A.C. 421. [1974] 3 All E.R. 887. All these cases are
discussed in detail, lnfra
17. "The Admissibility of Evidence of Similar Facts: A Re-Examination" in
Zelman Cowen and P.B. Carter, Essays on the Law of Evidence (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1956) at 106
288 The Dalhousie Law Journal
(ii) its admission is not unnecessary (i. e. the issue upon which it
is tendered can reasonably be regarded as a real one in the
circumstances of the case).
Rule 3. Evidence of similar facts which has substantial relevance
otherwise than via propensity (even if as well as via propensity) is
admissible provided it is sufficiently relevant.
Rule 4. In criminal cases the judge has a discretion to exclude
evidence admissible under any of the foregoing rules if their strict
application would operate unfairly against the accused.
N.B. It should be remembered that:
(a) Evidence which is relevant via propensity is a much wider
category than has often been supposed.
(b) Rule 2 means (obviously) that not all evidence the primary
relevance of which is via propensity is excluded.
(c) The nature of the issue to which the evidence is relevant (e.g.
that it is to show system, to prove intent,) does not control its
admissibility. The nature of the issue may, however, affect
the strength of the probative value of the similar fact
evidence and thus indirectly influence its admissibility. 18
The approach taken by Cowen and Carter is certainly more
satisfactory than others considered thus far. However, having
accepted probative value or weight as a vital factor, it is difficult to
see why the authors nonetheless insist upon the primary significance
of the distinction between relevance via propensity and relevance
other than via propensity.
3. An Approach Based Upon a Comparison of Probative Value and
Risk of Prejudice
The third approach, and the one argued for in the present article,
treats the balance between probative value and the risk of prejudice
as the key to determining the admissibility of similar fact evidence.
It is submitted that the question of whether the evidence derives its
relevance from an argument via propensity or from an argument
other than via propensity ought properly to be regarded as largely
incidental.
This approach involves treating Lord Herschell's formulation not
as containing two conflicting rules, one of exclusion and one of
inclusion, but rather as referring to two competing principles. 19 The
18. Id. at 160
19. This is the view taken by P. Brett, Abnormal Propensity Or Plain Bad
Character? (1954), 6 Res Judicata 471. On the distinction between rules and
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first sentence refers to the principle that evidence which shows the
accused to be of bad character or disposition is not admissible to
establish his guilt of the crime charged. The second sentence refers
to the principle that relevant evidence which does not fall within a
recognised rule of exculsion ought to be admitted.
The rationale behind the principle of exclusion embodied in the
first sentence of Lord Herschell's formulation is the risk of
prejudice inherent in evidence of this sort. The term "prejudice" is
here used in the sense adopted by Wigmore, i.e.
(1) The over-strong tendency to believe the defendant guilty of
the charge merely because he is a likely person to do such acts;
(2) the tendency to condemn, not because he is believed guilty of
the present charge, but because he has escaped unpunished from
other offences; both of these represent the principle of Undue
Prejudice.
20
What Lord Herschell's formulation requires is that these two
competing factors, the probative value of the evidence and the risk
of prejudice, he weighed one against the other. If the risk of
prejudice is great, and the probative value small by comparison, the
evidence should be rejected. If the probative value is great, and the
risk of prejudice slight by comparison, the evidence should be
admitted.
2 1
The problem of estimating the probative value of evidence is one
which has received surprisingly little attention. 22 Relevance and
principles, see R. M. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London: Duckworth,
1977), chs. 2 and 3
20. Wigmore on Evidence, supra, note 11 at 650. Wigmore also lists as a reason
for excluding evidence of the accused's bad character: "(3) The injustice of
attacking one necessarily unprepared to demonstrate that the attacking evidence is
fabricated; this represents the principle of Unfair Surprise." This danger could, of
course, be guarded against by the adoption of adequate notice procedure. It is
suggested that the risk of surprise is, at most, a subsidiary justification for the
principle of exclusion in relation to similar fact evidence.
21. The most influential proponent of this approach to understanding similar fact
evidence is L. H. Hoffman. See South African Law of Evidence (2nd. ed. Durban:
Butterworths, 1970), ch.3; Similar Facts After Boardman (1975), 91 L.Q.R. 193.
A similar approach is adopted by Ronald B. Sklar, Similar Fact Evidence -
Catchwords and Cartwheels (1977), 23 McGill Law Journal 60. In the most recent
edition of his book Evidence Professor Cross has moved significantly towards the
approach taken by Hoffman. Rupert Cross, Evidence (4th.ed. London:
Butterworths, 1974) at 309, 317-8. See also Richard Eggleston, Evidence, Proof
and Probability (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1978), ch. 7. And see, J.C.
Smith, Comment on R. v. Hurren [1962] Crim. L.R. 770
22. This largely neglected problem is the subject of an important recent
publication. Richard Eggleston, Evidence, Proof and Probability, note 21. See also
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weight are generally treated as matters of common sense or
experience both by judges and by academic commentators. In this
way, the difficulties associated with what is in fact the key concept
in the law of evidence are largely glossed over. It is, of course,
impossible to ever estimate the probative value of evidence with any
degree of exactitude. The degree of relevance possessed by an item
of evidence is obviously dependent upon an almost infinite number
of variables. In the present context the key variables appear to be the
nature of the similar fact evidence itself, the issues in contest in the
case and the other evidence presented in the case.
Equally it is extremely difficult to assess, even in a very
approximate fashion, the extent of the risk of an item of evidence
being misused by a jury so as to result in prejudice to the accused.
However, the risk of prejudice is quite clearly the rationale for the
exclusionary aspect of the similar fact rule. This being so, the
difficulty in estimating potential for prejudice in no way removes
the necessity for attempting some such estimate when determining
whether a given item of similar fact evidence ought to be admitted.
The present approach does not involve complete rejection of the
process of categorization which is the essence of the first approach
discussed. The traditional categories in fact group together types of
situation in which similar fact evidence is likely to possess a high
degree of probative value. They do so, however, in an imprecise
and haphazard way, and they have been accorded far greater
significance than they ought to possess. In the present article use
will be made of a set of categories of relevance. However, it is
stressed that these categories are used solely for purposes of
convenience.
The intent of this article is to re-examine the body of case law
dealing with similar fact evidence, from the point of view of
showing the clash of the competing principles of probative force and
risk of prejudice. It is hoped to show that the frank recognition of
these factors as the keys to what is in fact happening in the field of
similar fact evidence would lead to more acceptable results than
simplistic attempts to apply rules to a type of problem not truly
amenable to solution by the application of rules.
II. The Requirement of Relevance
It is a truism that to be admissible evidence must be relevant to a
fact in issue. It might therefore appear unnecessary to accord this
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requirement separate treatment in relation to similar fact evidence.
However, similar fact evidence is in a special category because of
its inherent prejudicial nature. Thus similar fact evidence not
sufficiently relevant to be admissible on ordinary principles (leaving
aside completely the exclusionary limb of Lord Herschell's
formulation in Makin) may sometimes be admitted. This is because
the shadow of suspicion it casts over the accused results in
insufficient attention being paid to the question of whether the
evidence possesses any real probative value.
The case of Maxwell v. Director of Public Prosecutions23 is
illustrative. The accused was charged with the manslaughter of a
woman who was alleged to have died as the result of an unlawful
abortion performed on her by the accused. At his trial the accused
was cross examined about another woman patient of his who had
died. In respect of this earlier death the accused had been tried and
acquitted of manslaughter. On this occasion the accused was
convicted. He appealed to the House of Lords where his conviction
was quashed. The House of Lords held that the cross examination as
to the earlier charge was improper. Delivering the judgment of their
Lordships, Viscount Sankey L.C. stated:
The mere fact that a man has been charged with an offence is no
proof that he committed the offence. Such a fact is, therefore,
irrelevant; it neither goes to show that the prisoner did the acts for
which he is actually being tried nor does it go to his credibility as
a witness. Such questions must, therefore, be excluded on the
principle which is fundamental in the law of evidence as
conceived in this country, especially in criminal cases, because,
if allowed, they are likely to lead the minds of the jury astray into
false issues; not merely do they tend to introduce suspicion as if it
were evidence, but they tend to distract the jury from the true
issue - namely, whether the prisoner in fact committed the
offence on which he is actually standing his trial.
24
In R. v. Bain2 5 the accused was charged with indecent assault
upon a twelve year old girl. The assault was said to consist of
G. James, Relevance, Probability and the Law (1941), 29 California Law Review
689; R. M. Eggleston, "The Relationship Between Relevance and Admissibility in
the Law of Evidence", in H. H. Glass ed., Seminars on Evidence (Sydney: Law
Book Company, 1970) at 53
23. [1935]A.C. 309; [1934] All E.R. 168.
24. Id. at 320 [1934] All E.R. 173. See also Koufis v. The King, [1941] S.C.R.
481; [1941] 3 D.L.R. 657; R. v. Tilley, [1953] O.R. 609; 106 C.C.C. 42 (C.A.).
Cf. R. v. Spreckley and Cootes (1958), 31 W.W.R. 187; 123 C.C.C. 344
(B.C.C.A.)
25. [1970]2 C.C.C. 49
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improper fondling in the course of purporting to take photographs.
The Crown sought to lead evidence of a subsequent incident of
picture taking. On this occasion also a young girl was involved, but
there was no evidence of indecent fondling. The magistrate before
whom the case was heard ruled evidence of this incident
inadmissible, and the Crown appealed unsuccessfully to the Nova
Scotia Supreme Court. Delivering the judgment of the Court,
Cooper J.A. stated:
The offence charged is indecent assault. Any similar act to be
admissible must, in my view, contain in itself the element of
indecency to be material. I do not find such element in her
evidence. The nearest approach to anything that could be said to
be indecent was that the accused in the course of taking the [later
pictures] . . . put [the girl's] hand on her stomach. Even if this
action could be said to supply an element of indecency, it is
"tenuous to a degree" and its prejudicial value would far exceed
its probative value.26
Sometimes insufficiently relevant evidence may be unobjectiona-
ble until counsel seeks to place an unwarranted complexion upon it.
It is submitted that this is what occurred in R v. Truscott.2 7 The
accused, a fourteen and a half year old youth, was charged with the
murder of a girl, Lynne Harper, who had been raped and strangled
to death. The accused was convicted and his appeal to the Court of
Appeal of Ontario dismissed. Application for leave to appeal to the
Supreme Court of Canada was refused. Seven years after the
original conviction, as the result of a special reference of the
Governor-General in Council, the Supreme Court of Canada was
asked to consider:
Had an Appeal by Steven Murray Truscott been made to the
Supreme Court of Canada, as is now permitted by [legislation not
in force at the time of the original application] . . . what
disposition would the Court have made of such an appeal . . .?
The case involved a number of issues, 28 only one of which is
26. Id. at 54. See also R. v. Weid (1949), 95 C.C.C. 108 (B.C.C.A.); R. v.
Doughty, [1965] 1 All E.R. 560; R. v. Hartridge (1967), 57 D.L.R. (2d) 332;
[1967] 1 C.C.C. 346 (Sask. C.A.); R. v. Tripp (1971), 5 C.C.C. (2d) 297; 16
C.R.N.S. 164 (C.A.).
27. R. v. Truscott (1960), 126 C.C.C. 109; 32 C.R. 150 (Ont. C.A.); Reference re
R. v. Truscott, [1967] S.C.R. 309; [1967] 2 C.C.C. 285.
28. All aspects of the case are dealt with in detail in M. L. Friedland, Cases and
Materials On Criminal Law and Procedure (4th.ed. Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1974), ch. 17. See also Isobel Le Bourdais, The Trial of Steven
Truscott (London: Gollancz, 1966).
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relevant in the present context. The accused and the deceased girl
had been classmates. The accused had taken the deceased on the
cross-bar of his bicycle to an area known as Lawson's bush. The
prosecution's case was that he had there raped and murdered her.
The accused's defence was that at her request he had taken her to an
intersection in the area, had left her there and had never seen her
again.
The prosecution led evidence of one Jocelyne Godette, also a
classmate of the accused, that an arrangement had been made
between her and the accused to see some new born calves at a spot
near where the accused subsequently rode with the murdered girl.
On the evening in question Jocelyne Godette was unable to go with
the accused when he called as she was just beginning supper with
her family. She testified that he had asked her to keep the
arrangement secret, and great emphasis was placed on this in
questions put to the witness both by the prosecutor and by the trial
judge. In his summation to the jury the prosecutor stated:
Well then, there was a tentative date for six o'clock on the
Tuesday night. And that he, Steven, came to the house and called
for her. He called there at ten minutes to six but she was having
her supper, and I suggest to you, Gentlemen, that if they were
late having their supper, it was a God's blessing to that girl.
Here is the relevancy of that, Gentlemen. He missed his first
prospect and what more logical and likely person to accept his
proposal to go with him on short notice than a girl he knows is
fond of him, soft on him, whatever you will, and likely to take up
his invitation? 2
9
It would seem, however, that the evidence of Jocelyne Godette
was of practically no relevance. Nothing could be more natural than
for a youth to make an arrangement to go on an expedition of such a
nature with a girl, or to ask her to keep the matter secret. The
making of the arrangement in no way went to show that later in the
evening the accused raped and murdered another girl. It is only if
one first assumes the accused is guilty of the murder of the second
girl that the arrangement with the first takes on a sinister aspect. The
evidence of Jocelyne Godette would have been unobjectionable had
it been led merely to establish the accused's movements earlier in
the evening. However, the complexion the prosecution sought to
place upon it gave it a spurious appearance of relevance of a quite
29. [1967] S.C.R. 309 at 387; [1967] 2.C.C.C. 285 at 364.
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different nature.
By a majority of eight to one the Supreme Court of Canada held
that the accused's appeal would have been dismissed. 30 The
majority stated:
We do not think that any of this conversation between Truscott
and Jocelyne Godette was any reflection on Truscott's character.
To put it at its worst for Truscott, it means no more than this: that
he had a tentative date arranged with Jocelyne Godette. He
wanted a date with a girl that night and he took Lynn Harper
when Jocelyne Godette was not available. We have already
mentioned that this has some bearing on the submission of the
prosecution that his story of the ride, the sole purpose of which
was to take her to the intersection, may not have been true. It
does not amount to trying to prove bad character or a disposition
to murder and rape.
31
A powerful dissent was delivered by Hall J. His Honour stated:
The evidence has no probative value to prove Truscott murdered
Lynne Harper and should have been rejected when tendered by
the rule which excludes evidence of similar acts which Viscount
Sankey said in Maxwell v. Director of Public Prosecutions,
[1935] A.C. 309 at p.31 7 , was "one of the most deeply rooted
and jealously guarded principles of our criminal law."
32
Commenting on the majority opinion, His Honour quoted the
passage set out above, and stated:
This appears to ignore the reality of the situation when considered
in the actual setting as it was being developed at the trial by
Crown counsel and entirely repugnant to what Crown counsel
said in the extracts from his summation to the jury quoted above
when he said, referring to Truscott having called for Jocelyne
Godette "and I suggest to you, Gentlemen, that if they were late
having their supper, it was a God's blessing to that girl" and
when he followed that with his reference to Lynne Harper and
said that Truscott gave Lynne the new-born calf invitation and
"that she went with him to the bush and to her doom".
Crown counsel was pursuing a planned course of action that
included the subtle perverting of the jury to the idea that Truscott
was sex hungry that Tuesday evening and determined to have a
girl in Lawson's bush to satisfy his desires, if not Jocelyne, then
Lynne. 3 3
30. Taschereau, C.J.C., Cartwright, Fauteaux, Abbott, Martland, Judson, Ritchie
and Spence JJ.; Hall J. dissenting.
31. [1967] S.C.R. 309 at 369; [1967]2 C.C.C. 285 at 348.
32. Id. at 387 [1967] 2 C.C.C. at 364
33. Id. at 388-9 [1967] 2 C.C.C. at 366
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It is respectfully submitted that the judgment of Hall J. is more
persuasive than that of the majority in Truscott's case, and that the
method in which the prosecution invited the jury to misuse the
evidence of Jocelyne Godette should have resulted in Truscott's
appeal being allowed.
III. Cases Where Similar Fact Evidence is Properly Admitted
1. Where the Evidence Establishes Knowledge
Where the accused is shown to have committed the acts said to
constitute the offence charged, similar fact evidence may be
admissible to show that at the time of committing those acts the
accused possessed a certain knowledge or awareness in relation to
facts or circumstances connected with those acts. The similar fact
evidence may tend to establish such knowledge or awareness in one
of two ways.
The evidence may consist of an experience which imparted to the
accused knowledge of a certain nature, which knowledge the
accused retained at the time of the incident the subject of the crime
charged. In R. v. Petryshen and Saiko34 the accused were charged
with possession of materials to be used for counterfeiting. A witness
for the accused Saiko testified that Saiko had no knowledge of the
nature of the materials or the use to which they were capable of
being put. It was held by the British Columbia Court of Appeal that
the trial judge correctly allowed cross examination of the witness as
to a previous conviction of Saiko and the witness for counterfeiting,
in order to establish Saiko had knowledge of the potential use of the
materials found in his possession.
Alternatively, the evidence may derive its relevance from the
improbability that an act of a certain class would be likely to be
repeated on a series of occasions without the accused possessing
awareness of certain accompanying facts.
In R. v. Francis35 the accused was charged with attempting to
obtain money from a pawnbroker upon a ring by the false pretence
that it was a diamond ring. Evidence was admitted that two days
previously he had obtained money from another pawnbroker upon a
chain which he falsely represented to be a gold chain, and that he
had attempted to obtain from other pawnbrokers money upon a ring
which he also represented to be a diamond ring. The accused was
34. (1956), 115C.C.C. 217; 18 W.W.R. 662
35. (1874), L.R. 2C.C.R. 128
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convicted, and his conviction affirmed by the Court for Crown
Cases Reserved. Delivering the judgment of the Court, Lord
Coleridge C.J. stated:
It seems clear upon principle that when the fact of the prisoner
having done the thing charged is proved, and the only remaining
question is, whether at the time he did it he had guilty knowledge
of the quality of his act or acted under a mistake, evidence of the
class received must be admissible. It tends to shew that he was
pursuing a course of similar acts, and thereby it raises a
presumption that he was not acting under a mistake. It is not
conclusive, for a man may be many times under a similar
mistake, or may be many times the dupe of another; but it is less
likely he should be so often, than once, and every circumstance
which shews he was not under a mistake on any one of these
occasions strengthens the presumption that he was not on the last,
and this is amply borne out by authority.
36
2. Where the Evidence Forms Part of the Transaction Under
Investigation
Such evidence may consist of an earlier attempt to commit the crime
charged. Evidence that the accused previously attempted to commit
the very crime he is alleged to have committed does, of course,
possess a relevance far beyond showing a general propensity to
commit crimes of the type charged. In Paradis v. The King 37 the
accused was charged with conspiracy to commit arson of a furniture
factory. The Supreme Court of Canada held that evidence that the
accused previously offered another man money to burn the same
factory was admissible.
Evidence of a similar fact nature which shows that at a point of
time proximate to the commission of the crime charged, the accused
possessed a propensity for the commission of the crime charged
may be admissible. The sole relevance of such evidence is, of
course, via propensity. The factor which gives evidence of this
36. Id. at 131-2; quoted with approval inR. v. Rhodes, [1899] 1 Q.B. 77 at 82.
See also R. v. Foster (1855), 1 Dears. 456; 169 E.R. 803; R. v. Weeks (1816), 8
Cox C.C. 451; R. v. Ollis, [1900] 2 Q.B. 758; R. v. Mason [1914], 10
Cr.App.Rep. 169; R. v. Labrie (1919), 60 D.L.R. 582; 34 C.C.C. 407 (Que.
K.B.); R. v. Hamilton, [1931] 3 D.L.R. 121; 55 C.C.C. 85 (C.A.);R. v. Porter
(1935), 25 Cr.App.Rep.59;R. v. Gregg (1965), 49 W.W.R. 732; [1965] 3 C.C.C.
203 (Sask. C.A.). Cf. R. v. Oddy (1851), 2 Den.C.C. 264; 169 E.R. 499; R. v.
Holt (1860), Bell C.C. 280; 169 E.R. 1261
37. [1934] S.C.R. 165; [1934] 2 D.L.R. 88. See also R. v. Gibson (1913), 13
D.L.R. 393; 21 C.C.C. 393 (Ont. C.A.);R. v. Doughty (1921), 64 D.L.R. 423; 38
C.C.C. 83 (Ont. C.A.)
The Problem of Similar Fact Evidence 297
nature its great weight is that it shows not merely that the accused
possesses a certain sort of propensity, but that he exhibited this
propensity and was prepared to act upon it at a point of time closely
proximate to the commission of the crime charged. 3
8
Illustrative is the Australian case of O'Leary v. The King. 3 9 The
accused and the deceased were both employees at an isolated timber
camp in South Australia. They, together with other fellow
employees, took part in a drunken orgy which commenced on
Saturday morning and continued until late on Saturday night. At
about midnight the deceased retired to his cubicle which was a short
distance from that of the accused. In the early hours of Sunday
morning the deceased was found in his cubicle in a dying condition.
He had been struck on the head eight or nine times with a bottle,
after which kerosine had been poured over him and set alight.
The prosecution led evidence that at various times during the
course of the orgy the accused (a) punched one Hollywood about the
head, knocked him down and continued to punch him while he was
on the floor; (b) grabbed one O'Toole by the throat and threatened
"to do" him; (c) knocked one Kimber down, and kicked him in the
body and in the head; (d) abused and threatened to assault and shoot
three other people.
The High Court of Australia held this evidence to be
admissible. 40 It did not merely show that the accused was of a
violent disposition. Its significance was that if showed the accused
was of a violent disposition, and was prepared to act on that
disposition, on the evening in question. Dixon J. stated:
In my opinion the evidence objected to was admissible, because,
from the time on Saturday 6th July when the prisoner and the
party with him came under the influence of drink right up to the
conclusion of the scene in the early hours of the following
38. In some cases, where the contemporaneity is very close, the doctrine of res
gestae may be applicable. In the cases to be discussed however, it would seem that
the similar facts were not sufficiently closely connected in point of time to be
regarded as part of the res gestae, even accepting that the scope of that doctrine has
been somewhat widened as a result of the decision of the Privy Council in Ratten v.
The Queen, [1972] A.C. 378; [1971] 3 All E.R. 801.
39. (1946), 73 C.L.R. 566. See also R. v. Voke (1823), Russ. and Ry. 531; 168
E.R. 934; R. v. Cobden (1862), 3 F. & F. 833; 176 E.R. 381; R. v. Rearden
(1864), 4 F & F. 76; 176 E.R. 473; R. v. Bahrey, (1934] 1 W.W.R. 376
(Sask.C.A.);R. v. Evans, [1950] 1 All E.R. 610;R. v. O'Regan, [1961] Qd.R. 78.
Cf. R. v. Bodnarchuk, [19491 3 D.L.R. 565; (1949), 94 C.C.C. 279; R. v.
Fitzpatrick, [1962] 3 All E.R. 840
40. Latham C.J., Rich, Starke, Dixon and Williams JJ.; McTiernan J. dissenting
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Sunday morning in the presence of the deceased's body lying in
front of the huts, a connected series of events occurred which
should be considered as one transaction. The part which the
prisoner took in the drunken orgy which, as the facts suggest,
culminated in the fatal attack upon the deceased man would
appear to me to be relevant to the question whether the prisoner
was the assailant and, if so, whether he was at the time capable of
forming, and did form, the intention which would make his crime
murder.
The evidence disclosed that, under the influence of the beer and
wine he had drunk and continued to drink, he engaged in repeated
acts of violence which might be regarded as amounting to a
connected course of conduct. Without evidence of what, during
that time, was done by those men who took any significant part in
the matter and especially evidence of the behaviour of the
prisoner, the transaction of which the alleged murder formed an
integral part could not be truly understood and, isolated from it,
could only be presented as an unreal and not very intelligible
event. 41
The evidence was given even greater probative value by the fact
that the killing took place at an isolated timber camp. Thus there
were a strictly limited number of persons who could have
committed the crime. 42 That earlier in the evening one of these men
had been on a drunken rampage was obviously of tremendous
probative value. Had the killing taken place in a town where any of
a large number of persons may have committed the crime, the
evidence would have been of much less weight. Quite clearly the
probative value of any particular item of evidence will vary having
regard to all the surrounding circumstances of the particular case.
The English case of R. v. Mortimer43 provides a further neat
illustration of similar fact evidence deriving great relevance from its
close temporal proximity with the crime charged. The accused was
charged with murder, the allegation of the prosecution being that he
had knocked down a woman cyclist by deliberately driving a motor
car at her. Evidence was admitted to the effect that on the previous
evening he had knocked down two other women cyclists in a similar
way and had stopped his car and assaulted them, and that shortly
after the incident which was the subject of the murder charge, he
had knocked down a further woman cyclist and had stolen her bag.
Here the evidence showed not merely that the accused had a
41. (1946), 73 C.L.R. 566 at 577
42. See in particular the judgment of Williams J. on this point, id. at 582.
43. (1936), 25 Cr.App.Rep. 150
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propensity for knocking down women cyclists, although such a
propensity would of itself have been sufficiently unusual to render
the evidence admissible,"4 but also that the accused was subject to
that propensity, and was prepared repeatedly to act upon it, on a
particular evening and throughout the following day.
3. Where the Offence is of a Continuing Nature
In some cases the definition of the crime charged involves an
element of continuity which can only be established by evidence of
a similar fact nature. In such situations the evidence is rendered
admissible by the very definition of the offence charged. Examples
of such crimes are permitting a house to be used as a brothel,
45
persistent importuning in a public place" and contributing to the
delinquency of a juvenile.
47
4. Where the Evidence Confirms Testimony Collateral to the Main
Issue
Where the testimony of the accused and that of a prosecution
witness are in conflict, evidence of a similar fact nature which
confirms the testimony of the witness as to a matter collateral to the
main issue may be admissible. The relevance of the evidence is that
if the account given by the witness is corroborated as to the
collateral matter, it is more probable that the witness is also telling
the truth in relation to the main issue in dispute. Thus in this context
similar fact evidence is admissible as going to support the credit of a
prosecution witness.
In R. v. Lovegrove48 the accused was charged with the
manslaughter of a woman who died as the result of an unlawful
abortion. The husband of the deceased gave evidence that, having
obtained the accused's name and address from another woman, he
went to the accused's house and arranged with her for his wife to go
there in order that the accused might perform an abortion on her.
The husband testified that he subsequently accompanied his wife to
the accused's house, where an abortion was performed as a result of
which she died. The other woman was called by the prosecution,
44. Infra. p. 299
45. Exparte Burnby, [1901]2 Q.B. 458; R. v. Brady, R. v. Ram, [1964] 3 All
E.R. 616
46. Dale v. Smith, [1967] 2 All E.R. 1134
47. R. v. Christakos, [1947] 2 D.L.R. 151; (1946), 87 C.C.C. 40
48. [192013 K.B. 643
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and gave evidence that the accused had performed an abortion on
her some months previously. The accused's defence was that the
only time she had seen the husband was when he called to inquire
about accommodation, and that she had never met the deceased.
The accused was convicted and appealed unsuccessfully to the
Court of Criminal Appeal. The Court held that the evidence of the
other woman as to the abortion performed upon her was properly
admitted, as it tended to corroborate the husband's evidence.
In R. v. Chitson49 the accused was charged with carnal
knowledge of a girl aged fourteen. The prosecutrix gave evidence
that on the day after connection had taken place, the accused told
her that he had previously had similar relations with another young
girl. It was held by the Court of Criminal Appeal that the accused
was properly cross examined about his relations with the other girl.
Delivering the judgment of the Court A. T. Lawrence J. stated the
cross examination was admissible, as it
• . . tended to shew that he was guilty of the offence with which
he was charged, for if he had made that statement to the
prosecutrix at the time alleged by her, that fact would strongly
corroborate her evidence that the prisoner was the person who
had had connection with her. 50
The admissibility of the similar fact evidence in cases such as R.
v. Lovegrove and R. v. Chitson is dependent upon the accused
giving evidence. It may also depend upon the nature of the evidence
given by the accused. If in R. v. Lovegrove the accused had
admitted the deceased's husband had come to her house and
attempted to arrange an abortion, but had denied that she performed
the abortion, evidence of the other woman as to the abortion
performed on her by the accused would not have been admissible.
In such event the evidence would not have acted as corroboration
upon any point in dispute between the testimony of the deceased's
husband and the accused.
It is submitted that cases such as R. v. Lovegrove and R. v.
Chitson should be regarded as right on the borderline of
admissibility of similar fact evidence. To admit evidence with such
a high degree of potential for prejudice in order to do no more than
support the credit of a prosecution witness involves considerable
risk of injustice.
49. [190912 K.B. 945
50. Id. at 947. See alsoR. v. Kennaway, [191711 K.B. 25
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5. Where the Circumstances Surrounding the Similar Fact
Evidence are Relevant Independently of the Similar Facts
Where the fact that the accused has committed another offence is
largely incidental to that which it is proposed to prove by similar
fact evidence, such evidence will normally be admissible. For
example, the accused is charged with murder and denies being
anywhere near the scene of the killing. Evidence that shortly before
the killing the accused had committed another crime in the same
vicinity would, of course, be admissible. 51 It would be admissible
since its character as similar fact evidence would be wholly
incidental to its relevance.
In Perkins v. Jeffrey52 the accused was charged with indecently
exposing himself to a certain Miss T. Miss T gave evidence for the
prosecution, identifying the accused as the person who had exposed
himself to her. The prosecution put to him in cross examination
questions suggesting that he had exposed himself to Miss T on an
earlier occasion, and to rebut his denials sought to recall Miss T to
prove that the accused had been guilty of the same conduct to her at
the same time and place approximately two months earlier. The
prosecution also desired to call other witnesses to show that the
accused had been guilty of a systematic course of conduct by
indecently exposing himself with intent to insult other females on
various occasions at the same place and at about the same hour. The
justices before whom the case was heard ruled that the questions as
to the accused's earlier conduct in relation to Miss T ought not to
have been put, and refused to hear further evidence from Miss T or
from the other witnesses. The accused was discharged by the
justices, and the prosecution appealed the Divisional Court.
The Court held that the questions put to the accused in cross
examination suggesting that he had earlier indecently exposed
himself to Miss T was permissible, and that evidence of Miss T to
rebut his denials ought to have been received. Such evidence was
relevant for the purpose of showing that Miss T was not mistaken in
her identification of the accused. So far as Miss T was concerned
the evidence possessed a relevance entirely independent of its
character as similar fact evidence. It was relevant as showing that
51. R. v. Ducsharm, [1956] 1 D.L.R. (2d) 732; (1955), 113 C.C.C. 1. On the
facts of R. v. Ducsharm it is submitted that the dissenting judgment of Laidlaw
J.A. is to be preferred to that of the majority. See also R. v. O'Meally, [1953]
V.L.R. 30
52. [1915]2 K.B. 702
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Miss T had previously seen the accused, and was therefore less
likely to be mistaken in her identification of him as the person
exposing himself to her on the occasion the subject of the charge.
The evidence of the witnesses other than Miss T raised a number
of separate issues, and this aspect of Perkins v. Jeffrey will be
considered presently.
53
6. Where the Evidence Bears on the Relationship Between the
Accused and the Victim
Evidence which shows no more than that the accused possesses a
general provensity towards a certain class of criminal activity is, of
course, inadmissible. However, if the propensity can be rendered
more specific by virtue of the fact that the crime charged and the
similar fact evidence each have as their object the same individual,
the evidence may be admitted. Evidence of a propensity directed
specifically towards another person, whether taking the form of
sexual passion or violent antipathy, is often sufficiently probative to
be admissible notwithstanding its extreme potential for prejudice.
(a) Sexual Passion
The leading case is the decision of the House of Lords in R. v.
Ball. 54 The two accused, who were brother and sister, were indicted
under the Punishment of Incest Act 1908 (U.K.) for having had
carnal knowledge of each other during stated periods in 1910.
Evidence was given on behalf of the prosecution to the effect that, at
the times specified in the indictment, the accused were living
together in the same house, that the house contained only one
furnished bedroom, and that there was in the bedroom a double bed
which bore signs of two persons having occupied it. The
prosecution then tendered evidence of prior sexual relations
between the two accused. The evidence was to the effect that the
male accused in November 1907 took a house to which he brought
the female accused as his wife, that they lived there as husband and
wife for about sixteen months, that at the end of March 1908 the
female accused gave birth to a child, and that she registered the
birth, describing herself as the mother and the male accused as the
father. These events took place prior to the enactment of the
Punishment of Incest Act 1908 (U.K.), at a time when incest
53. Infra. p. 302
54. [1911]A.C. 47
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between a brother and sister was not unlawful.
The accused were convicted and appealed to the Court of
Criminal Appeal where the convictions were quashed. The
prosecution then appealed to the House of Lords, which reversed
the order of the Court of Criminal Appeal. Delivering the judgment
of the House of Lords, Lord Loreburn L.C. stated:
My Lords, the law on this subject is stated in the judgment of
Lord Chancellor Herschell in Makin v. Attorney-General for New
South Wales; it is well known and I need not repeat it - the
question is only of applying it. In accordance with the law laid
down in that case, and which is daily applied in the Divorce
Court, I consider that this evidence was clearly admissible on the
issue that this crime was committed - not to prove the mens rea,
as Darling J. [delivering the judgment of the Court of Criminal
Appeal] considered, but to establish the guilty relations between
the parties and the existence of a sexual passion between them as
elements in proving that they had illicit connection in fact on or
between the dates charged. Their passion for each other was as
much evidence as was their presence together in bed of the fact
that when there they had guilty relations with each other. 
55
The sole relevance of the evidence was, of course, via
propensity. However the degree of relevance possessed by the
evidence was sufficient to justify admissibility. If an accused is
charged with incest with sister A, evidence that on some other
occasion he committed incest with sister B would not be of
sufficient probative value to be admissible. 56 In such event the
similar fact evidence would establish no more than a propensity to
commit incest. However, where the similar fact evidence
establishes a propensity directed exclusively towards the individual
the subject of the instant charge, the probative value of the evidence
is increased to such an extent that admissibility may be justified.
This is so notwithstanding that the evidence clearly involves a very
great risk of prejudice.
The weight of the similar fact evidence in R. v. Ball was also
affected by the other evidence presented in the case. The fact that
while living together they occupied the same bed, when taken
together with the similar fact evidence, made the likelihood of
sexual intercourse having taken place very high. If, for example, no
more had been shown than that they lived together in the same
house, the similar fact evidence would have been of less probative
55. Id. at 71
56. R. v. O'Regan, [1961] Qd.R. 78;R. v. Flack, [1969] 2 All E.R. 784.
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force. This, when coupled with its extreme potential for prejudice,
would probably have resulted in its exclusion.
The decision of the House of Lords in R. v. Ball has been
followed many times in Canada. It has been applied not only to




In R. v. Drysdale6l the accused was charged with the murder of the
three year old daughter of his defacto wife. The child's mother and
a brother gave evidence that the accused beat the girl into
unconsciousness, inflicting injuries upon her as a result of which
she quickly died. Evidence was admitted that the accused had
assaulted the girl on previous occasions. Evidence was also
admitted of a number of vicious assaults by the accused upon other
children of the family and upon the houshold pet. The accused was
convicted and appealed successfully to the Manitoba Court of
Appeal.
The Court held that while evidence of the earlier assaults upon the
deceased little girl were admissible as showing a specific antipathy
towards her, evidence of assaults upon the other children and upon
the family pet were inadmissible. Delivering the judgment of the
Court, Freedman J.A. stated:
Dealing first with the evidence of earlier assaults upon Angela
[the deceased child], I would admit that evidence on the ground
of relevance, particularly on the issue of intent. That evidence
could provide a nexus or link with the alleged murder and could
show the existence of a continuing animus or malice on the part
of the accused towards the child.
57. R. v. Pegelo, [1934] 2 D.L.R. 798; (1934), 62 C.C.C. 78 (B.C.C.A.); R. v.
Beddoes (1952), 103 C.C.C. 131; 6 W.W.R. (N.S.) 62 (Sask. C.A.); R. v.
Thompson (1954), 110 C.C.C. 95; 14 W.W.R. (N.S.) 575 (B.C.C.A); R. v.
Williams (1973), 12 C.C.C. (2d) 453 (Ont. C.A.). See also the New Zealand case,
Wilkinson v. The Queen, [1947] N.Z.L.R. 412
58. R. v. Stelmasczuk (1948), 93 C.C.C. 124; 8 C.R. 430 (N.S.S.C.)
59. R. v. Collerman, [1964] 3 C.C.C. 195; 46 W.W.R. 300 (B.C.C.A.)
60. R. v. Bristol, [1926] 4 D.L.R. 753; (1926), 46 C.C.C. 156. See also R: v.
Shellaker, [1914] 1 K.B. 414;R. v. Marsh (1949), 33 Cr.App.Rep. 185
61. [1969]2 C.C.C. 141; 66 W.W.R. 664. See also Theal v. The Queen (1882), 7
S.C.R. 397; R. v. Sunfield (1907), 13 C.C.C. 1; 15 O.L.R. 252 (C.A.); R. v. Le
Forte (1961), 29 D.L.R. (2d) 459; 130 C.C.C. 318 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Wilson
(1970), 44 A.L.J.R. 221; R. v. luliano, [1971] V.R. 412; R. v. McDonald (1974),
20 C.C.C. (2d) 144 (Ont.C.A.); R. v. Schell and Paquette (1977), 33 C.C.C. (2d)
422 (Ont. C.A.). SeeR. v. Demyen (No. 2) (1976), 31 C.C.C. 383 (Sask. C.A.)
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Concerning the evidence of prior acts relating to others than
Angela, I am decidedly of the view that these were irrelevant and
inadmissible. 62
It is not, of course, the case that similar fact evidence showing
prior antipathy towards the victim will necessarily be admissible.
The key is always the degree of probative value possessed by the
evidence.
In R. v. Barbour63 the accused was charged with the murder of
his girl friend. The prosecution's case was that the accused had
killed the woman in a fit of jealous passion aroused by her conduct
with another man. Evidence of several previous quarrels and
assaults by the accused upon the deceased was admitted. The latest
in point of time was about a week before the fatal incident.
Following each of these quarrels the accused and the deceased had
resumed amicable relations.
The accused was convicted and appealed successfully to the New
Brunswick Supreme Court. An appeal by the prosecution to the
Supreme Court of Canada was dismissed by a majority of three to
two.6 4 The view of the majority was that the evidence failed to show
anything in the nature of consistent jealously of, or antipathy
towards, the victim on the part of the accused. The evidence was
therefore not sufficiently relevant to be admissible. Sir Lyman P.
Duff C.J.C. stated:
If you have acts seriously tending, when reasonably viewed, to
establish motive for the commission of a crime, then there can be
no doubt that such evidence is admissible, not merely to prove
intent, but to prove the fact as well. But I think, with the greatest
possible respect, it is rather important that the Courts should not
slip into a habit of admitting evidence which reasonably viewed
cannot tend to prove motive or to explain the acts charged merely
because it discloses some incident in the history of the relations
of the parties.
6 5
Similar fact evidence showing prior antipathy was also held
inadmissible in R. v. Robertson. 6 6 The accused, a sixteen year old
youth, was charged with the murder of the nine year old sister of a
62. [196912 C.C.C. 141 at 145-6; 66W.W.R. 664at 668-70
63. [1038] S.C.R. 465; (1938), 71 C.C.C. 1. See also R. v. Wied, [1950] 1
D.L.R. 143; (1949), 95 C.C.C. 108;R. v. Tsingopoulos, [1964] V.R. 676
64. Sir Lyman P. Duff, C.J.C.; Rinfret and Davis JJ. concurring. Kerwin and
Hudson JJ. dissented
65. [1938] S.C.R. 465 at469; (1938), 71 C.C.C. I at 19-20
66. (1975), 21 C.C.C. (2d) 385
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friend. The girl was murdered at her home when she returned there
from school during the lunch hour. The accused's connection with
the crime was established largely by circumstantial evidence. His
defence was a complete denial. The prosecution led evidence of two
prior incidents involving the accused and the girl. The first, which
took place some ten or fourteen days before the killing, involved a
threat made by the accused to the deceased. The accused, with
others, was at the victim's home, and the accused was being noisy.
The victim came out of the bedroom and asked if the others would
"quiet [the accused] down". The accused replied: "You get ----
back in the bedroom or I'll kick you in the --- ". The second incident
took place later the same evening. The accused was alleged to have
made a remark that he was going to do something "similar to
shooting at a police officer" or do "something better than [shooting
at a police officer]".
The accused was convicted of murder and appealed to the Ontario
Court of Appeal. The Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new
trial. The Court held that evidence of the two prior incidents ought
not to have been admitted.
With respect to the first incident, Martin J.A., with whom the
other members of the Court agreed, 67 stated that evidence that an
accused entertained feelings of hatred or hostility towards the
deceased was relevant to prove the accused killed the deceased.
Further, that evidence of prior threats were admissible to prove the
existence of feelings of such hostility. However, His Honour held
that on the facts of the instant case the evidence was not of sufficient
probative value to justify admissibility. His Honour stated:
The utterance of the accused in the circumstances cannot be
regarded other than as an unseemly venting of feelings of
temporary annoyance and on any reasonable view is not evidence
of feelings of ill will or enmity constituting a motive for the
murder of the deceased. The evidence with respect to such
utterance was accordingly inadmissible. 68
With respect to the second incident, His Honour stated:
A threat may be generic in character, and accordingly a threat to
shoot at the police would be admissible on a charge of murdering
a policeman although the threat was not directed towards the
particular policeman who was killed. As a general rule, however,
a threat by an accused to kill A would not be admissible on a
67. Gale C.J.O., Dubin J.A. Dubin J.A. dissented in part as to different matters.
68. (1975), 21 C.C.C. (2d) 385 at 411
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charge of murdering B . . . [Even if the statement made by the
accused is capable of being construed as a threat referable to the
deceased] its admissibility is so tenuous, having regard to the
context in which the words were uttered, and of such slight
probative value in relation to its prejudicial effect, that the trial
Judge, in the exercise of his discretion, would be justified in
excluding it. 69
7. Where the Propensity Established by the Evidence is
Particularly Uncommon
In some exceptional cases the disposition or propensity exhibited in
the commission of the crime charged is of sufficiently uncommon a
nature to render admissible similar fact evidence establishing such a
propensity in the accused. Perhaps the clearest example of such an
exceptional propensity is provided by the case of R. v. Straffen,
which has already been discussed in detail.
70
R. v. Morris71 was a similar case. The accused was charged with
the murder in August 1968 of a girl D aged eight (count 1). The
little girl had been enticed into a car by the killer, driven to a
secluded spot and there sexually assaulted in a brutal fashion and
killed by suffocation. The accused was also charged with the
attempted abduction in November 1968 of a girl A aged ten (count
2), and with indecent assault in August 1968 on a girl Y aged five
(count 3). The trial judge refused an application to sever the
indictment and try the offences separately, holding that the evidence
on the other charges was admissible against the accused on the
murder charge. The accused pleaded guilty on count 3. He was
convicted on counts 1 and 2, and appealed unsuccessfully to the
Court of Appeal.
The similarities in the offences were as follows. All three cases
involved little girls. Each of the offences were alleged to have been
committed in the same geographical locality. The murdered girl had
been enticed into a motor car driven by the killer, and count 2
likewise involved a similar, in this case unsuccessful, attempt to
entice the little girl into a motor car driven by the accused. The
Court held that this element of similarity rendered the evidence on
count 2 of sufficient probative value to be admissible in relation to
count 1.
69. Id. at412
70. Supra, p. 307
71. (1970), 54 Cr.App.Rep. 69
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The major focus of the Court's attention concerned count 3. The
little girl the subject of this count was a relative of the accused's
wife and had come to visit with them. Whilst she was staying in the
house, the accused took a series of grossly indecent photographs of
her. In relation to poses, arrangement of clothes, and other details,
the photographs bore a close similarity to the position and attitude of
the dead body of the little girl the subject of count 1.
The evidence of the photographs was obviously of the most
extreme prejudice, and the Court of Appeal properly considered the
issue before it as being whether the evidence was of such
exceptional probative value as to justify admissibility. Delivering
the judgment of the Court Widgery L.J. stated:
In this case to render the evidence of the photographs admissible,
it is not enough for the Crown to show that they indicate a
tendency on the part of the applicant to sexual deviation. The
Crown in order to make the evidence admissible must go further
and show that there is a sufficient similarity between the
applicant's conduct when the photographs were taken, and the
conduct of the murderer, to give a real and positive indication
that they were one and the same man. It is not necessary to show
that the circumstances are so similar that the same man must have
been concerned in each case. The admissibility of the evidence
depends on whether the similarities are sufficient to show that the
applicant and the murder have common characteristics which are
so unusual that it is likely that they are one and the same man.
72
After a careful review of the evidence, His Lordship concluded it
was properly admitted. His Lordship stated:
Looking at the similarities of the matter, the most important one,
in our judgment, is the one which strikes anyone opening these
two albums of photographs [the photographs of the deceased, and
the photographs taken by the accused of the girl Y]. Words of
mine would be insufficient to convey the really quite remarkable
impression which a comparison of these photographs makes, and
I shall not attempt to describe the detail, sordid as it is, further
than that. The situation of the clothing is common, the attitude of
the body is common, the child is lying on her back, and so
on . . ..
When one looks at those similarities, it becomes clear that the
murderer and the applicant had this common characteristic of
lustful design on little girls and a similarity in the method in
which they gratified that lust, and the number of men similarly
afflicted is happily not such as to make them other than
72. Id. at 80
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exceptional in any community. The evidence therefore (when one
realises that these two incidents were geographically close
together and that the applicant himself lives in what is part of the
same relatively small community) does point to the fact that both
offences were committed by one and the same man.
73
Clearly the most important case in recent years on the subject of
similar fact evidence is the decision of the House of Lords in
Director of Public Prosecutions v. Boardman.74 The accused was
convicted on one count of buggery with S, aged 16, and one count
of buggery with H, aged 17. Both boys were pupils at a language
school at which the accused was headmaster. Each of the boys gave
evidence that the accused came to his dormitory late at night, and
asked him to come with him for the purpose of homosexual
intercourse. In each case the boy said the accused invited him to
take the active role while he, the accused, assumed the passive. In
each case the particular occasion to which the charge related was not
the only incident affecting that boy.
At the trial the judge directed the jury that the evidence of S on
the count concerning him was admissible as corrobative evidence in
relation to the count concerning H, and vice versa. The decision of
the House of Lords two years earlier in Director of Public
Prosecutions v. Kilbourne75 had established that, where similar fact
evidence is admissible, it may constitute corroboration.
The accused appealed unsuccessfully first to the Court of Appeal
and then to the House of Lords.
Director of Public Prosecutions v. Boardman is of particular
significance for a number of reasons. Prior to this case there was a
considerable body of authority in support of the view that cases
involving homosexuality stood in a special category, and that in
such cases similar fact evidence was always admissible. Their
Lordships squarely rejected such a view. This aspect of the case will
be returned to presently.
76
73. Id. at 82-3. SeeR. v. Willett (1972), 10 C.C. (2d) 36
74. [1975] A.C. 421: [1974] 3 All E.R. 887. For helpful discussions of D.P.P. v.
Boardman, see Rupert Cross, Fourth Time Lucky - Similar Fact Evidence in the
House of Lords, [1975] Crim.L.R. 62; L.H. Hoffman, Similar Facts After
Boardman (1975), 91 L.Q.R. 193; Richard Eggleston, Evidence, Proof and
Probability, at 80-2. D.P.P. v. Boardman has been considered in a number of
subsequent English cases. See R. v. Rance (1975), 62 Cr.App.Rep. 118; R. v.
Scarrott, [1977]3 W.L.R. 629;R. v. Mansfield, [1978] 1 All E.R. 134
75. [1973] A.C. 729; [1973] 1 All E.R. 440
76. Infra. p. 309
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Although their Lordships continued to insist that the rule to be
followed is expressed adequately in the formulation of Lord
Herschell in Makin, 77 the decision in Director of Public
Prosecutions v. Boardman marks a significant change in judicial
approach to the admissibility of similar fact evidence. Their
Lordships declined to treat the issue as turning on whether the
evidence fell within a recognised category of admissibility.
Likewise, the majority of their Lordships declined to give
significance to the question of whether the evidence was relevant
solely via propensity or whether it possessed some relevance other
than via propensity. Instead, perhaps more clearly than in any
previous case, their Lordships treated the admissibility of similar
fact evidence as turning solely upon a balancing of the probative
value of the evidence against its potential for prejudice.
Lord Wilberforce stated:
Whether in the field of sexual conduct or otherwise, there is no
general or automatic answer to be given to the question whether
evidence of facts similar to those the subject of a particular
charge ought to be admitted. In each case it is necessary to
estimate (i) whether, and if so how strongly, the evidence as to
other facts tends to support, i.e., to make more credible, the
evidence given as to the fact in question, (ii) whether such
evidence, if given, is likely to be prejudicial to the accused. Both
these elements involve questions of degree. 78
Lord Cross stated:
The question must always be whether the similar fact evidence
taken together with the other evidence would do no more than
raise or strengthen a suspicion that the accused committed the
offence with which he is charged or would point so strongly to his
guilt that only an ultra-cautious jury, if they accepted it as true,
would acquit in face of it. In the end - although the admissibility
of such evidence is a question of law, not of discretion - the
question as I see it must be one of degree.
79
Only Lord Hailsham laid stress upon the distinction between
relevance via propensity and other relevance. His Lordship stated:
It is perhaps helpful to remind oneself that what is not to be
admitted is a chain of reasoning and not necessarily a state of
facts. If the inadmissible chain of reasoning is the only purpose
for which the evidence is adduced as a matter of law, the
77. Supra. p. 310
78. [1975]A.C. 421 at442; [1974]3 All E.R. 887 at896
79. Id. at 457 [1974] 3 All E.R. at 909
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evidence itself is not admissible. If there is some other relevant,
probative purpose than for the forbidden type of reasoning, the
evidence is admitted, but should be made subject to a warning
from the judge that the jury must eschew the forbidden
reasoning.8 0
It is difficult to see how Lord Hailsham was, in the context of
Director of Public Prosecutions v. Boardman, able to insist upon
the importance of this distinction. In Director of Public
Prosecutions v. Boardman the similar fact evidence had no major
relevance other than via propensity; the propensity to catamite
homosexuality.
The House of Lords held that because of the striking similarity in
the accounts given by the boys S and H, the evidence of each boy
was admissible in respect of the count relating to the other. Their
Lordships did, however, have some reservations as to the
sufficiency of the probative value of the evidence of the two boys.
Lord Wilberforce stated: "I confess to some fear that the case, if
regarded as an example, may be setting the standard of 'striking
similarity' too low".81 Similarly, Lord Cross remarked: "I must
say that I regard this as very much a border-line case".
8 2
The trial judge had taken the view that the fact that an adult had
induced an adolescent boy to play the active, while he played the
passive, part in the acts of buggery was itself a sufficiently unusual
feature to justify the admission of the evidence. The majority of
their Lordships declined to accept this view.8 3 Lord Salmon stated:
Whenever these unnatural practices are indulged in, someone ex
hypothesi is in the active and someone in the passive role. It ntay
be that it is most unusual for the older man to be in the passive
role. If it is so, then there is a striking similarity between the two
cases. For all I know, however, the one may be as ususal as the
other, in which case there is not the striking similarity between
the case of S. and that of H upon which the learned trial judge
relied. 84
80. Id. at 453 [1974] 3 All E.R. at 905-6
81. Id. at445 [1974] 3 All E.R, at898
82. Id. at 461 [1974) 3 All E.R. at 912
83. Lord Morris, id. at 442 [1974] 3 All E.R. at 895; Lord Hailsham id. at 447 and
455[1974] 3 All E.R. at 900 and 907 Lord Cross, id. at 461 [1974] 3 All E.R. at
912 and Lord Salmon, id. at 467 [1974] 3 All E.R. at 914. Lord Wilberforce, while
expressing doubts on the point, accepted the view taken by the trial judge. Id. at
445; [1974] 3 All E.R. at 898.
84. Id. at 463 [197413 All E.R. at 914. Note also Lord Cross, id. at 460; [1974] 3
All E.R. at 912.
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The majority held, however, that when the other similarities in the
stories of the two boys, in particular the accused's nocturnal visits to
the dormitories, was added to the peculiar nature of the accused's
homosexuality, the evidence was sufficiently probative to be
admissible .85
The peculiar nature of the propensity exhibited by the accused
rendered similar fact evidence admissible in the recent Canadian
case of R. v. Simpson. 86 The accused was charged on two counts of
attempted murder. The victim in both cases was a woman. Both
cases involved a similar form of attack and both had a sexual
connotation. The first victim was attacked after leaving a tavern
frequented by the accused. The assailant seized her around the neck
from behind, and stabbed her. He then attempted to rape her. The
victim testified that her attacker had a body odour. The victim
identified the accused as her attacker. The second victim met the
accused at the same tavern a month later. They then went to the
accused's apartment where intercourse took place. The victim
became aware that the accused had a body odour. After intercourse
the victim left the accused's apartment. As she was leaving the
building she was seized around the neck from behind and stabbed.
Her attacker said, "You will never talk". The victim testified that it
was the accused who stabbed her as there was no one else present in
the vicinity.
The trial judge permitted the two counts to be tried together, and
declined to direct the jury to disregard the evidence on one count in
considering the other. The accused was convicted and appealed to
the Ontario Court of Appeal. The Court held that the peculiar form
of murderous propensity exhibited by the accused, when taken
together with the similarities in the circumstances surrounding the
two attacks and the fact that both victims testified to their attacker
having a body odour, rendered the evidence in each count of
sufficient probative value in respect of the other count to justify its
admissibility. 
87
8. Where the Evidence Confirms an Identification
(a) The Principle of Thompson v. The King
85. Lord Morris, id. at 442 [1974] 3 All E.R. at 895; Lord Hailsham, id. at 455
[1974] 3 All E.R. at 907; Lord Cross, id. at 461 [1974], 3 All E.R. at 912; and
Lord Salmon, id. at 463; [1974] 3 All E.R. at 914
86. (1977), 35 C.C.C. (2d) 337
87. The accused's appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered on other grounds.
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In Thompson v. The King88 the accused was charged with
committing acts of gross indency with two boys. The acts in respect
of which the charges were brought were alleged to have occurred on
March 16, and the person who committed them was alleged to have
made a further appointment with the boys for March 19. The police
were informed in the meantime, and they kept watch with the boys
at the rendezvous - a public lavatory. At the appointed time the
accused arrived at the rendezvous, and was identified by the boys as
the man who had committed the offences on the 16th. The accused's
defence was one of mistaken identity. At his trial the prosecution
tendered evidence that when arrested on the 19th the accused was
carrying powder puffs, and that he had indecent photographs of
boys in his room. The accused was convicted and apppealed
unsuccessfully first to the Court of Criminal Appeal and then to the
House of Lords.
The significance of the powder puffs and the indecent
photographs was that they showed the accused to be a
homosexual. 89 The House of Lords held that, in the very special
circumstances of the case, evidence showing the accused to be a
homosexual was admissible to support the identification of him by
the two boys. Lord Finlay L.C. stated:
The whole question is as to the identity of the person who came to
the spot on the 19th with the person who committed the acts on
the 16th. What was done on the 16th shows that the person who
did it was a person with abnormal propensities of this kind. The
possession of the articles tends to show that the person who came
on the 19th, the prisoner, had abnormal propensities of the same
kind. The criminal of the 16th and the prisoner had this feature in
common, and it appears to me that the evidence which is objected
to afforded some evidence tending to show the probability of the
truth of the boys' story as to identity. 90
The other members of the House of Lords adopted similar reasoning
to that of Lord Finlay.
91
The reasoning adopted by their Lordships was essentially as
follows. The person who committed the offences and who made an
88. [19181A.C. 221
89. While no doubt unusual, it is in fact highly doubtful if the carrying of powder
puffs does possess any real probative value in suggesting that a man is a
homosexual. See Hales v. Kerr, [1908] 2 K.B. 601
90. [1918]A.C. 221 at 225-6
91. Lord Dunedin, Lord Atkinson, Lord Parker of Waddington, Lord Sumner and
Lord Parmoor
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appointment to be at point A at time B possessed a certain unusual
propensity, he was a homosexual. The accused was present at point
A at time B. The similar fact evidence established that the accused
possessed the same unusual propensity. Thus, in the absence of a
remarkable coincidence, the accused and the individual who
committed the offences were the same person. Having regard to all
the circumstances of the case, in particular the identification of the
accused by the two boys, the similar fact evidence thus possessed
sufficient probative value to justify its admission.
It is submitted that the reasoning of their Lordships was based
upon two untested premises. First, it appears to have been an
unstated assumption throughout the case that homosexuality is a
very rare condition indeed. This was, of course, an understandable
assumption in 1918. It is now estimated that at least 4% of adult
males are exclusively homosexual throughout their lives. 92 It would
seem then that the coincidence required for the accused to have been
innocent was of considerably less magnitude than was believed to
be the case by their Lordships. Secondly, nothing appears from the
report of the case as to the nature of the area in which the offences
occurred and the accused was arrested. If the locality was one
regularly frequented by homosexuals, then the fact that at the
appointed time the accused who was a homosexual was in the
vicinity was of quite limited probative value.
If Thompson v. The King were to occur again on its precise facts,
it is submitted that the similar fact evidence ought not to be
admitted. 93 Homosexuality is now recognised as sufficiently
common to render the evidence of insufficient probative value to
justify admissibility in view of its great potential for prejudice. The
facts would, however, only need to be changed slightly to render the
evidence of much greater probative value and therefore to justify
admissibility. If, for example, the person who committed the
92. This is the estimate made in the Kinsey Report. Alfred C. Kinsey, Wardell B.
Pomeroy, Clyde E. Martin, Sexual Behavior in the Human Male (Philadelphia and
London: W. B. Saunders Company, 1948) at 651. The figure of 4% relates to males
who are exclusively homosexual. The authors estimated that 37% of the total male
population has at least some overt homosexual experience to the point of orgasm
between adolescence and old age. Id. at 650. More recent studies would suggest
that the actual percentages are, if anything, higher than those estimated by the
authors of the Kinsey Report. See generally the references listed in M. Foster and
K. Murray, A Not So Gay World (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1972) at
237-240
93. Note R. v. Morris (1969), 54 Cr.App.Rep. 69 at 79. Contra R. Cross,
Evidence (4th ed.) at 334
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offences arranged to meet the victims again on a deserted hillside,
or in a graveyard at midnight, evidence that the person who kept the
appointment possessed the same propensity would be admissible.
(b) Unwarranted Extensions of Thompson's Case
As has been shown, the point involved in Thompson v. The King
was quite narrow indeed. That decision has, however, often been
mis-interpreted and treated as authority for the proposition that
cases involving sexual deviance, and in particular cases involving
homosexuality, constitute a special category in relation to which
similar fact evidence is always admissible. Largely responsible for
this misinterpretation of Thompson v. The King is an obiter dictum
in the judgment of Lord Sumner. In a remarkable passage His
Lordship stated:
The evidence tends to attach to the accused a peculiarity which,
though not purely physical, I think may be recognized as properly
bearing that name. Experience tends to show that these offences
against nature connote an inversion of normal characteristics
which, while demanding punishment as offending against social
morality, also partake of the nature of an abnormal physical
property. A thief, a cheat, a coiner, or a house-breaker is only a
particular specimen of the genus rogue, and, though no doubt
each tends to keep to his own line of business, they all alike
possess the by no means extraordinary mental characteristic that
they propose somehow to get their livings dishonestly. So
common a characteristic is not a recognizable mark of the
individual. Persons, however, who commit the offences now
under consideration seek the habitual gratification of a particular
perverted lust, which not only takes them out of the class of
ordinary men gone wrong, but stamps them with the hall-mark of
a specialized and extraordinary class as much as if they carried on
their bodies some physical peculiarity.
94
The tendency to regard cases involving homosexuality as
standing in a special category has by no means been universal,
95
and in England such a view has now been squarely rejected by the
94. [1918] A.C. 221 at 235
95. For cases in which such evidence has been properly rejected by the Courts in
the application of ordinary principles, see R. v. Cole (1810), noted [1946] K.B.
541;R. v. Bailey, [1924] 2 K.B. 300;R. v. Southern (1930), 22 Cr.App.Rep. 6;R.
v. Boynton, [1935] 1 D.L.R. 687; (1934), 63 C.C.C. 95 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Cole
(1941), 165 L.T. 125; R. v. Hughes (1949), 33 Cr.App.Rep. 59; R. v. Carter,
[1956] Crim.L.R. 722;R. v. Chandor, [1959] 1 Q.B. 133;R. v. Horwood, [1970]
1 Q.B. 133
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House of Lords in Director of Public Prosecutions v. Boardman. 96
It will, therefore, be sufficient to focus upon three illustrative cases;
two English and one Canadian. 
97
In R. v. Sims98 the accused was convicted on three counts of
buggery with three different men. The evidence of each man was
that the accused had invited him to his house, and had there
committed the acts charged. On appeal to the Court of Criminal
Appeal it was argued that in respect of each count evidence
concerning the other two counts ought to have been held to be
inadmissible. This argument was rejected by the Court. Delivering
the judgment of the Court, Lord Goddard C.J. stated:
The evidence of each man was that the accused invited him into
the house and there committed the acts charged. The acts they
describe bear a striking similarity. That is a special feature
sufficient in itself to justify the admissibility of the evidence. 99
The logic of the argument here being put is unexceptionable. If
there had been some feature strikingly peculiar about the three
incidents, then the similar fact evidence would have been
admissible upon ordinary principles. However, there is nothing in
the reportof the case to suggest that anything other than acts of
buggery of the ordinary kind occurred.
Immediately following the passage quoted above, His Lordship
went on to place the Court's decision upon a wider basis. His
Lordship stated:
• . . we think [the admissibility of the evidence] should be put on
a broader basis. Sodomy is a crime in a special category because,
as Lord Sumner said [His Lordship then quoted from the
judgment of Lord Sumner in Thompson v. The King] . . . . On
this account, in regard to this crime we think that the repetition of
the acts is itself a specific feature connecting the accused with the
crime and that evidence of this kind is admissible to show the
nature of the act done by the accused.' 00
In R. v. Hall'01 the accused was charged on an indictment
96. Infra. p. 316
97. For other cases in which it is submitted such evidence has been wrongly
admitted, seeR. v. Twiss, [1918] 2 K.B. 853;R. v. Ailes (1918), 13 Cr.App.Rep.
173; R. v. Berg (1927), 20 Cr.App.Rep. 38; R. v. Gillingham (1939), 27
Cr.App.Rep. 143; R. v. Lyons, [1944] 4 D.L.R. 206; (1944), 81 C.C.C. 280
(B.C.C.A.); R. v. Jeffries (1946), 47 S.R. (N.S.W.) 284; R. v. Cambell, [1956] 2
Q.B. 438;R. v. King, [1967] 2 Q.B. 338;R. v. Twomey, [1971] Crim.L.R. 277
98. [1946] 1 K.B. 531
99. Id. at 539-40
100. Id. at 540
101. [1952]1 K.B. 302
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containing eight counts alleging gross indecency with three different
young men. The accused's defence to the charges in the case of two
of the young men (C and B) was that the acts complained of were
done in the course of medical treatment. The accused and these
young men had met at a medical institution at which the accused
worked. In the case of the third man (R) the accused's defence was
that he had never met him. At the trial application was made for
each case to be tried separately. The trial judge refused the
application, giving as his reason that all the evidence to be called on
all the counts could have been called on any one of them. The
accused was convicted on all counts, and appealed unsuccessfully to
the Court of Criminal Appeal.
The judgment of the Court was delivered by Lord Goddard C.J.
In relation to C and B his Lordship correctly held that the
similarities between the two sets of incidents were sufficient to
justify the admissibility of the evidence to rebut the accused's
defence of lack of criminal intent. ' 0 2 In relation to R, however, His
Lordship again returned to the view he had put forward inR. v. Sims
that homosexuality is itself a sufficiently unusual characteristic to
justify the admission of similar fact evidence. In relation to R, His
Lordship stated:
The only cage which caused the court momentary difficulty was
the case of R., because in that case the appellant's defence was
that he had never seen R. in his life before, and he did not say that
he was giving R. medical treatment. But the evidence of the other
men became material on the very ground on which the House of
Lords upheld the admission of evidence in Thompson v. The
King, namely, that it went to identity. The meaning of that
expression is that the evidence goes to show that the witness for
the prosecution is speaking the truth when he says that the
appellant was the man who did the indecent things to him,
because it shows that the appellant is a man addicted to unnatural
practices. That was what justified the evidence in this case with
regard to R. It was for the jury to say whether R. was a liar or a
witness of truth, and in deciding that question they were entitled
to take into account the evidence given by C. and B. '
0 3
Clearly the view adopted by Lord Goddard C.J. inR. v. Sims and
R. v. Hall is in principle wrong. Where the accused is charged with
a homosexual offence, evidence that he is in fact a homosexual
obviously has tremendous potential for prejudice. On the other hand
102. See generally, infra. p. 317
103. [1952] 1 K.B. 302 at 308
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it is, without more, of quite limited value. It shows no more than
that the accused belongs to a class of person, a class comprising 4%
or more of the population, members of which class possess a
propensity for acts of the kind charged.
It is submitted that similar fact evidence of insufficient probative
value was improperly admitted in R. v. Glynn. 104 The accused was
charged with murder. Traces of semen were found in the anus of the
deceased. The trial judge admitted in evidence proof that the
accused had engaged in homosexual acts on previous occasions.
The accused was convicted and appealed. The Ontario Court of
Appeal, relying on Thompson v. The King, upheld the decision of
the trial judge. Gale C.J.O. stated:
• . . in a case where it was proved death could have been caused
only by a left-handed person, evidence that the accused had the
characteristic of being left-handed would clearly be admissible on
the question of identity, so in this case where the death may well
have been caused by a homosexual with certain characteristics it
was proper to show that the accused was a homosexual with those
characteristics. 105
It is, with great respect, suggested that this analogy is fallacious.
The distinction between the two cases is that left-handedness does
not, but homosexuality does, carry with it the risk of prejudice. It is
this danger which necessitates the requirement of greater relevance
before admissibility can be justified in the case of homosexuality. If
the accused were charged with murder committed in the course of a
rape, there can be no doubt that evidence that he had previously
raped someone else would, without more, be inadmissible. There
can be no justification for treating a propensity towards
homosexuality differently.
The decision of the House of Lords in Director of Public
Prosecutions v. Boardman has already been discussed in detail. 1'
In that case the House of lords held that no special rules are
applicable in cases involving homosexuality.' 0 7 Lord Hailsham
stated:
There is not a separate category of homosexual cases. The rules
of logic and common sense must be the same for all trials where
104. (1972), 5 C.C.C. (2d) 364
105. Id. at 365-6
106. Supra, p. 318. See also D.P.P. v. Kilbourne, [1973] A.C. 729; [1973] I All
E.R. 440.
107. [1975] A.C. 421 at 441, 443, 455, 458, 461; [1974] 3 All E.R. 887 at 895,
896-7, 907, 909-10,912
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"similar fact" or other analogous evidence is sought to be
introduced. ' 0 8
Lord Cross described the words of Lord Sumner in Thompson v.
The King as sounding "nowadays like a voice from another
world". 0 9 The decision in R. v. Sims was accepted by their
Lordships as authority only for the proposition that such similar fact
evidence is admissible where there is in fact a "striking similarity"
between the various incidents. "10
The approach adopted in Director of Public Prosecutions v.
Boardman, that in all cases, including those involving homosexual-
ity, the key to the admissibility of similar fact evidence is probative
value, was applied by the Court of Appeal in the recent case of R. v.
Scarrott. I" The accused was charged on 13 counts of homosexual
offences, involving eight young boys and covering a period of four
and a half years. The trial judge refused counsel's application for
separate trials in respect of each boy. During the course of the trial
the judge ruled that the evidence given by each boy relating to the
count or counts concerning him was admissible on the other counts.
The accused was convicted and appealed unsuccessfully to the
Court of Appeal.
Delivering the judgment of the Court, Scarman L.J. stated:
Positive probative value is what the law requires, if similar fact
evidence is to be admissible. Such probative value is not
provided by the mere repetition of similar facts; there has to be
some feature or features in the evidence sought to be adduced
which provides a link - an underlying link as it has been called
in some of the cases. The existence of such a link is not to be
inferred from mere similarity of facts which are themselves so
common place that they can provide no sure ground for saying
that they point to the commission by the accused of the offence
under consideration. "
2
The Court carefully reviewed the evidence, and held that the
similarities in the accounts given of the various incidents by the
boys were such as to render the evidence of sufficient probative
value for it to be admissible.
108. Id. at 455-456 [1974] 3 All E.R. at 907
109. Id. at 458 [1974] 3 All E.R. at 909
110. Id. at 439-440, 444, 450, 456, 458, 461 [1974] 3 All E.R. at 893, 897,
902-3, 908, 909-10 and 912
111. [1977]3W.L.R.629
112. Id. at 634
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9. Where the Propensity Renders a Lack of Criminal Intent
Particularly Unlikely
Where it is established that the accused committed the actus reus of
the crime charged, evidence of a similar fact nature may often be of
sufficient relevance to be admissible to show that he possessed the
appropriate mens rea. The present category is a further illustration
of the point that the probative value of a particular item of evidence
may depend upon all the other evidence in the case. Evidence which
shows the accused previously committed a crime similar to that
presently charged may render extremely improbable any defence
that in the instant case the accused lacked the relevant mens rea.
(a) Unlawful Abortion
Where an accused is charged with performing an unlawful abortion
the fact that he has performed such abortions in the past is, without
more, not sufficiently relevant to be admissible.' 13 Where,
however, it is established that a miscarriage was procured, and the
accused's defence is that the operation was lawful, evidence of prior
unlawful abortions may become admissible.
In R. v. Bond 1 4 the accused, a doctor, was charged with
feloniously using instruments upon a woman with intent to procure
her miscarriage. The patient was at the time pregnant by the
accused. The accused admitted using instruments upon the woman,
but denied that he had done so with the intention of procuring an
abortion. The prosecution called another woman to give evidence
that 9 months previously, at a time when she also was pregnant by
the accused, he had used similar instruments upon her with the
avowed intention of bringing about her miscarriage. This witness
further testified that on that occasion he told her "he had put dozens
of girls right".
The Court for Crown Cases Reserved held by a majority of five to
two that this evidence was properly admitted. "15 The court held that
the evidence was admissible both as establishing a systematic
course of conduct on the part of the accused, and also as rendering
113. Brunet v. The King, [1928] 3 D.L.R. 822; (1928), 50C.C.C. 1. (S.C.C.);R.
v. Campbell, [1947] 1 D.L.R. 904; (1946), 86 C.C.C. 410 (B.C.C.A.); R. v.
Hrechuk, [1950] 2 W.W.R. 318; (1950), 98 C.C.C. 44 (Man. C.A.)
114. [190612K.B. 389
115. Kennedy, Darling, Jelf, Bray and A. T. Lawrence JJ.; Lord Alverstone C.J.
and Ridley J. dissenting
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extremely improbable the accused's defence that he acted without
criminal intent. A. T. Lawrence J. stated:
If the act charged is manifestly an intentional act, but the defence
is that it was honestly or properly done, such evidence is
admissible to rebut this defence by shewing knowledge of some
fact essential to guilty knowledge or by shewing that in other
cases similar acts have been committed by the prisoner by the like
means under the like circumstances. The number of cases and the
peculiarity of the circumstances tend to shew the improbability of
the innocent intention. 116
The decision in R. v. Bond was followed by the Supreme Court of
Canada in Brunet v. The King. 1 7
(b) Other Cases
In many different types of case similar fact evidence may be
admissible as rendering highly improbable any defence of lack of
criminal intent. It will be sufficient to give a few illustrations. 118
The facts of R. v. Mortimer"9 have already been stated. The
accused was charged with murder, the allegation of the prosecution
being that he had knocked down a woman cyclist by deliberately
driving a motor car at her. Evidence was led to the effect that during
the course of that day and the previous evening the accused had
knocked down three other women cyclists in a similar way. This
evidence was of great probative value via a number of different, but
related, chains of reasoning. First, it established that the accused
possessed a propensity of a highly unusual and specialised nature.
Secondly, it established not only that the accused possessed such a
propensity, but that he possessed and was prepared to act on the
propensity at a point of time very proximate to the incident the
subject of the charge. Thirdly, it rendered extremely improbable
116. [1906] 2 K.B. 389 At 421. See also R. v. Palm (1910), 4 Cr.App.Rep. 253;
R. v. Thompson [1912], 7 Cr.App.Rep. 276; R. v. Starkie, [1922]2 K.B. 275
117. [1918], 42 D.L.R. 405; 30 C.C.C. 16. See also R. v. Anderson, [1935] 4
D.L.R. 32; (1935), 64 C.C.C. 205 (B.C.C.A.) Cf. R. v. Pollard (1909), 15
C.C.C. 74 (Ont. C.A.)
118. R. v. Hough (1806), Russ. & Ry. 120; 168 E.R. 714; R. v. Balls (1836), 1
Moo. C.C. 470; 168 E.R. 1348;R. v. Wilson (1911), 21 C.C.C. 105 (Alb. C.A.);
R. v. Boyle and Merchant, [1914] 3 K.B. 339; R. v. Cline (1956), 4 D.L.R. (2d)
480; 115 C.C.C. 18 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Chandler, [1956] S.R. (N.S.W.) 335; R. v.
Davis, [1963] Crim.L.R. 40; R. v. Marshall, [1966] 4 C.C.C. 206 (B.C.C.A.);
DeBlois v. The Queen (1964), 44 C.R. 399 (Que.C.A.); LeBlanc v. The Queen
(1975), 29 C.C.C. (2d)97;R. v. Doubrough (1977), 35 C.C.C. (2d)46
119. (1936), 25 Cr.App.Rep. 150
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any defence the accused might raise that he did not intend to hit the
woman he was charged with having killed.
Delivering the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal Lord
Hewart L.C.J. stated:
It appears to us that it was of crucial importance to show that
what was done in relation to [the deceased woman] was
deliberately and intentionally done . . . . In our opinion, this
evidence . . . was plainly necessary to prove something which
was really in issue, namely, the intent with which the prisoner did
the act, if he was the person who did it. 1
2 0
It is not uncommon for a single item of evidence to possess more
than one type of relevance. Where a given item of evidence
possesses relevance via two or more chains of reasoning that may,
in certain cases, give the evidence greater overall probative value
and constitute additional justification for its admission.
In Perkins v. Jeffreyl 2 the accused was charged with exposing
himself with intent to insult to a certain Miss T. The prosecution
desired to call other witnesses to testify that the accused had
previously exposed himself with intent to insult other females on
various occasions at the same place and about the same hour. The
Divisional Court held that such evidence would be admissible if, but
only if, the accused put forward the defence that he had not exposed
himself wilfully or with intent to insult. In such event the evidence
would possess great probative value in rendering such a defence
highly improbable.
In R. v. Harrison-Owen'22 the accused was charged with
burglary. He was found in a house, where a party was in progress,
at 1 a.m. He had taken a handbag from a car parked outside, and
found in it a key with which he had let himself in. The accused's
defence was that he had no recollection of entering the house, and
that he must have done so in a state of automatism. It was held by
the Court of Criminal Appeal that in these circumstances evidence
of the accused's prior convictions for burglary were not admissible.
It is submitted that the view taken by the Court in R. v.
Harrison-Owen was unduly favourable to the accused. The similar
fact evidence possessed very great probative value, rendering
extremely improbable the accused's defence of lack of mens rea. R.
120. Id. at 157.
121. [1915]2 K.B. 702. SeeR. v. Coombes (1960), 45 Cr.App.Rep. 36
122. [195112 All E.R. 726
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v. Harrison-Owen has been criticised, 123 and it is likely that it will
not be followed in England.
In Boulet v. The Queen124 the accused was charged with first
degree murder for the premeditated killing of the deceased. The
prosecution case was that the accused and three other men had
planned and carried out the execution by shooting of the victim. The
accused had taken the police to the scene of the killing, and pointed
out the grave in which the deceased's body, decomposed by a
caustic substance, was found. The accused's defence was that the
deceased had tried to kill one of his companions, and that the
companion had then killed the deceased in self-defence. To rebut
this defence the trial judge admitted evidence of the accused
showing the police another nearby grave, in which the body of a
person known to the accused had been buried. This person had also
been shot to death, and the body was in a state of decomposition as
the result of a caustic substance.
The accused was convicted, and appealed unsuccessfully to the
Supreme Court of Canada. Delivering the judgment of the Court,
Beetz J. stated:
The prosecution had to prove premeditation, and a systematic
course of action has a clear tendency to establish premeditation.
On the other hand, the prosecution was confronted by a defence
which had several aspects. One of these was that the appellant
found himself caught up by accident in an unforeseeable
misadventure, and that as a result his intent was innocent, since
he in no way willed the victim's death. Evidence of a similar act
showing a systematic course of action, premeditation and guilty
intent is admissible to rebut such a defence. 
125
10. Where the Evidence Establishes a System
Similar fact evidence may often be admissible to show that the
crime charged constitutes merely one incident forming part of a
systematic course of conduct engaged in by the accused. Such
similar fact evidence may possess a relevance in either of two ways.
On the one hand, where the instant crime has been committed in a
peculiar or unusual manner, similar fact evidence may be
admissible to show that on other occasions the accused has
committed similar crimes in the same unusual manner. The
123. Per Lord Denning in Bratty v. A. G. for Northern Ireland, [ 1963] A.C. 386 at
410. Note also R. Cross. Reflections on Bratty's Case (1962), 78 L.Q.R. 238
124. (1977), 34 C.C.C. (2d) 397
125. Id. at411
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significance of the similar fact evidence in such cases is that it
establishes a certain modus operandi. This type of evidence of
system is often spoken of as "the hallmark doctrine".
On the other hand, the evidence may fall short of establishing that
on other occasions the accused in fact committed any criminal acts.
Here the relevance of the evidence is of a different nature. The
evidence establishes that a series of like transactions has occurred.
The accused was connected with each of these transactions, and in
respect of each he may or may not have committed a crime. As the
number of transactions multiplies however, it becomes clear that
either the accused has committed a crime in respect of each
transaction or an increasingly remarkable coincidence has occurred.
A useful and simple illustration of this type of relevance is
provided by the analogy of tossing a coin. 12 6 The chances of the
coin landing heads on one toss are, of course, even. If the coin is
tossed twice the chances of its landing heads on both occasions are 4
to 1 against. If the coin is tossed 10 times the chances of its landing
heads on each occasion are 1,024 to 1 against. At this stage the
transaction is susceptible of two possible interpretations. Either a
remarkable coincidence has occurred, or the coin is not true. With
each toss, the likelihood that the coin is not true increases. Similar
fact evidence possessing a relevance of this nature is often spoken of
as going to rebut a defence of accident or involuntary conduct.
(a) Cases Involving a Similar Modus Operandi
The case of R. v. Bird127 is a particularly vivid example of an
accused utilising an unusual modus operandi. The accused was
charged with obtaining sexual intercourse from a woman by the use
of threats, accusations or menaces. 128 The victim, a Mrs. Salmon,
testified that a telephone call was made to her house, and that she
mistook the caller for a family friend, one Ian MacDonald. The
caller was able to ascertain that Mrs. Salmon's husband had been
out drinking with Ian McDonald the night before. He then told her
that in the course of the evening the husband had committed an
indecent act with another woman, that someone had taken pictures,
and that the woman had the pictures and threatened to circulate them
126. See Richard Eggleston, Evidence, Proof and Probability, supra, note 21, ch.
2
127. [1970] 3 C.C.C. 340. See also the Australian case Griffith v. The King
(1937), 58 C.L.R. 185.
128. Criminal Code s.291.
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unless the victim would do the same thing with him, Ian McDonald.
The caller again telephoned later in the morning. Still impersonating
Ian MacDonald he stated that he could not take part in the act, but
that the other woman had a friend who would visit Mrs. Salmon
shortly for that purpose. Shortly after a man identified by Mrs.
Salmon as the accused arrived impersonating the friend of the other
woman. Sexual intercourse then took place between him and Mrs.
Salmon. The accused then left. Some time later Mrs. Salmon
realised she had been duped. She telephoned Ian MacDonald and
ascertained that he had had no part in the proceedings, and that in
reality nothing had happened the night before.
The prosecution was permitted to lead evidence of two similar
incidents involving a Mrs. Hutchinson and a Miss Thorburn. Mrs.
Hutchinson testified to receiving a telephone call. She believed the
caller to be a friend. He told her that the night before a woman had
enticed him to her home. She had given him marijuana and the two
of them went to bed. He said that the woman's brother had come
and taken some pictures of the scene. He asked her if she would
have intercourse with the woman's brother, in which event the
brother would return the pictures to him. Subsequently there was
another call from a person who identified himself as the brother.
The caller stated he was coming over. Shortly after the accused,
purporting to be the brother, arrived and sexual intercourse took
place.
Miss Thorburn, an 18 year old schoolgirl, gave evidence that
someone called her purporting to be a Dr. Archer. He told her that
her mother had a venereal disease, and was concerned that she might
communicate it to the daughter. He wanted to come over and see her
in about half an hour. She agreed. Subsequently the accused,
purporting to be Dr. Archer, arrived. He told her he wished to take
scrapings from her vagina. She refused however, and he left.
The accused was convicted and appealed to the British Columbia
Court of Appeal. The Court held that the similar fact evidence was
admissible to support Mrs. Salmon's identification of the accused as
the person who had duped her into having sexual intercourse.
Delivering the judgment of the Court Branca J.A. stated:
The person who committed the crime on Mrs. Salmon was one
who adopted a uniquely similar modus operandi with Mrs.
Hutchinson and Miss Thorburn. The conduct was extraordinary.
The telephone conversations, in all three cases, were singularly
patterned. The man in each case was one who was seeking sexual
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gratification from a woman who was previously unknown to him,
in her own home, in the middle of the day .... It was this
hallmark which made his conduct in the Hutchinson and in the
Thorburn cases admissible evidence in reference to his
identification by Mrs. Salmon as the man who had had sexual
intercourse with her.1
29
It may be doubted whether the incident concerning Miss
Thorbum was sufficiently similar to justify admissibility. The only
points of similarity were that a call was made to a complete
stranger, and that sexual gratification was sought by the device of
impersonation. In relation to Mrs. Hutchinson however, the modus
operandi was so unusual and so strikingly similar to that used in the
case of Mrs. Salmon that the evidence was clearly of the highest
possible probative value.
To be admissible the similar fact evidence need not be of such an
unusual or striking nature as to make it virtually certain that the
crimes were committed by the same man. In R. v. Lawson'3 0 the
accused was convicted on three counts in an indictment charging
that (i) he did forcibly seize E.K., (ii) he did rape P.K., and (iii) he
did unlawfully assault H. W. All three crimes were committed in a
suburb of Calgary over a period of 55 days, with two of the
complainants being attacked at the same intersection. In two of the
cases the assailant threatened the girls with a knife, and in the third
case he threatened her with a gun. In each case the assailant flung
his arm around the neck of the girl. In two of the cases (counts (ii)
and (iii)) the girls were approached by the assailant and asked for
directions. In two of the cases (counts (i) and (ii)) they were forced
into the assailant's car, and required to sit astraddle the console of
the car.
It was held by the Alberta Supreme Court that the similarity
between the crimes was such that evidence in respect of each count
was admissible on the other two counts. Delivering the judgment of
the Court McDermid J.A. stated:
Although the charges are different there can be no doubt that the
purpose of the assailant in each case was to abduct the girl so he
could rape her. Is there a sufficient similarity between the crimes,
so that it is probable that they were committed by the same man?
129. [1970] 3 C.C.C. 340 at 345.
130. (1971), 3 C.C.C. (2d) 372. See alsoR. v. Robinson (1953), 37 Cr.App.Rep.
95; R. v. Pickard, [1960] Crim.L.R. 125; R. v. Murphy (1971), 56 Cr.App.Rep.
249 Cf. R. v. Blackledge, [1965] V.R. 397;R. v. Wilson (1973), 58 Cr. App. Rep.
169
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If so, the evidence on each count does not have to be considered
separately. I do not think the Crown need go so far as to show
that the evidence of similarity is such that it demonstrates beyond
a reasonable doubt that the crimes were committed by the same
man. It is sufficient if it is shown by a preponderance of evidence
that they were probably so committed. 
1 31
Confidence tricksters often persistently utilize a similar modus
operandi. Provided the modus operandi is of a reasonably
specialised kind, similar fact evidence will often be of sufficient
probative value to be admissible. In R. v. Gregg132 for example, the
accused was charged on six counts of obtaining grain by deceit. 133
The accused entered into agreements with farmers by which he
obtained barley on his undertaking to pay for the barley once the
precise quantity was ascertained. The accused sold the barley, but
made no payments to the farmers. Similar fact evidence was
admitted that the accused, both on an earlier and on a subsequent
occasion, had entered into similar arrangements with other farmers.
In these cases also the accused had obtained produce but had made
no payments in return. It was held by the Saskatchewan Court of
Appeal that in respect of each count the similar fact evidence,
including the evidence on the other five counts, was admissible to
rebut any defence of innocent intent. The evidence established not
merely that the accused was a confidence trickster, but that he was a
confidence trickster who habitually obtained similar property by
employing the same fraudulent device.
(b) Cases Where the Repetition of Similar Events Renders an
Innocent Explanation of those Events Improbable
Makin v. Attorney-General for New South Wales134 is itself an
131. Id. at 378
132. [1965] 3 C.C.C. 203. See also R. v. Cooper (1849), 3 Cox C.C. 547; R. v.
Rhodes, [1899] 1 Q.B. 77; R. v. Ollis, [1900] 2 Q.B. 758; R. v. Wyatt, [1904] 1
K.B. 188; R. v. Boyle and Merchant, [1914] 3 K.B. 339; R. v. Baker (1925), 45
C.C.C. 19 (S.C.C.); Bruck v. The King (1942), 80 C.C.C. 52 (Que. C.A.); R. v.
Melynk, [1948] 2 D.L.R. 274; (1947), 90 C.C.C. 257 (B.C.C.A.); R. v.
Giovannone (1960), 45 Cr.App.Rep. 31; R. v. Salerno, [1973] V.R. 59; Alward
and Mooney v. The Queen (1977), 35 C.C.C. (2d) 392 (S.C.C.). Cf.R. v. Fisher,
[1910] 1 K.B. 149; R. v. Ellis, [1910] 2 K.B. 746; R. v. Baird (1915), 11
Cr.App.Rep. 186; R. v. Boothby (1933), 24 Cr.App.Rep. 112; R. v. Slender
(1938), 26 Cr.App.Rep. 155;R. v. Hamilton, [1939] 1 All E.R. 469;R. v. Brown,
Smith, Woods and Flanagan (1963), 47 Cr.App.Rep. 205
133. Criminal Code s.323(1)
134. Supra, note I
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example of evidence possessing this sort of relevance. It was not
established that the Makins had murdered any of the thirteen infants
whose bodies were found buried in the grounds of premises
occupied by them at various times. However, when the similar fact
evidence and the evidence in the instant case were considered
overall, one of two conclusions was necessary. Either the Makins
had been remarkably unfortunate, and that thirteen infants left in
their care had died of natural causes. Alternatively, the Makins were
engaged in systematically taking in infants in return for payment,
and then killing the infants in order to avoid the cost of maintaining
them. Since coincidences of the order required for the first possible
hypothesis to be correct are extremely rare, it followed that the
similar fact evidence was of very high probative value. Being of
such high probative value it was, in spite of its great potential for
prejudice, properly admitted.
Another example is provided by the famous "brides in the bath
case", R. v. Smith. 135 The accused was charged with the murder of
a woman, Bessie Mundy, with whom he had gone through a
bigamous marriage ceremony. The accused had abandoned the lady
shortly after the marriage ceremony, but some eighteen months later
they met again and were reunited. Shortly afterwards the lady
executed a will in favour of the accused. He then had a bath
installed in the house, and some three days later the lady was found
drowned in it. The prosecution was permitted to tender evidence of
two other incidents in which "wives" of the accused had drowned.
Some eighteen months after the death of Bessie Mundy the accused
had gone through a form of marriage with another woman. An
insurance policy was taken out on her life, and she made a will in
135. (1915) 11 Cr.App.Rep. 229. A more complete account of the facts of this
case is contained in Eric R. Watson (ed.), The Trial of George Joseph Smith
(London: 1922).
For other examples of evidence possessing this form of relevance, see generally
R. v. Richardson (1860), 2F. & F. 343; 175 E.R. 1088;R. v. Gray (1866),4F. &
F. 1102; 176 E.R. 924; R. v. Roden (1874), 12 Cox C.C. 630; R. v. Colclough
(1882), 15 Cox C.C. 92;R. v. Hamilton, [1931] 3 D.L.R. 121; (1931), 55 C.C.C.
85 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Pinsk, [1935] 1 D.L.R. 307; (1934), 63 C.C.C. 201
(Sask.C.A.); R. v. Mortimer (1936), 25 Cr.App.Rep. 150; Martin v. Osborne
(1936), 55 C.L.R. 367; R. v. Sommers (1958), 122 C.C.C. 6 (B.C.S.C.); R. v.
MacPherson, [1964] 2 O.R. 101; [1964] 3 C.C.C. 170 (C.A.); R. v. Mansfield,
[1978] 1 All E.R. 134. See also the poisoning cases, R. v. Geering (1849), 18
L.J.M.C. 215; R. v. Garner (1864), 3 F. & F. 681; 176 E.R. 313; R. v. Cotton
(1873), 12 Cox C.C. 400; R. v. Heeson (1878), 14 Cox C.C. 40; R. v. Flannagan
(1884), 15 Cox C.C. 403;R. v. Grills (1954), 73 W.N. (N.S.W.) 303.
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the accused's favour. Shortly after she too was found drowned in a
bath. Yet a year later another of the accused's "wives" was found
drowned in her bath, this time the night after their "marriage". This
lady also had insured her life shortly before the tragedy, and on the
day of her death she had made a will in the accused's favour.
The accused was convicted, and appealed unsuccessfully to the
Court of Criminal Appeal. The Court held the similar fact evidence
to have been properly admitted. There were only two possible
explanations of the succession of events which had occurred. Either
the accused was an extremely unfortunate individual in that three
times over a period of less than three years a "wife" of his had died
in a precisely similar and highly unusual accident. Alternatively, the
accused was engaged in the business of marrying and then
murdering unfortunate women for financial gain. The high order of
coincidence required for the first hypothesis to be true justified the
admissibility of the similar fact evidence.
In R. v. Stawycznyj l3 6 the accused was charged with the murder
of the newly born child of his de facto wife. The mother gave
evidence that immediately following the birth of the child he
grabbed it by the neck. She told him to let it alone. He replied he
would be ashamed to let people know and continued to hold it by the
neck for ten minutes or more, choking it. He then put the child's
body in a box and buried it in the garden. The mother gave further
evidence that intimacy between her and the accused resumed, and
that a year later she gave birth to a boy, and the following year to
twin boys. She testified that the accused also strangled these babies
a few minutes after their birth. He also put their bodies in boxes
which he buried in places in the garden. The bodies of four babies
were found buried in the garden.
The accused was convicted and appealed to the Manitoba Court
of Appeal. By a majority of four to one the Court held that the
similar fact evidence had been properly admitted and dismissed the
appeal. 
13 7
It was suggested by the majority however, that while the fact of
the deaths was admissible, the testimony of the mother that it was
the accused who killed the three subsequently born children was not
admissible. Prendergast C.J.M. stated:
136. [1933]4 D.L.R. 725; (1933), 60 C.C.C. 153
137. Prendergast C.J.M., Dennistoun, Trueman and Richards JJ.A.; Robson J.A.
dissenting
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In the present case, what the Crown sought to establish was not
that the accused murdered those three children . . . . The
Crown's object in this case was to show that these children all
died within a few minutes after their birth, which was for the
purpose of suggesting to the jury that it is not in the course of
nature or of usual events that they should have all died of accident
or disease in such brief time, or in other words, that the cause of
their death was designed and that a crime was thus committed
whoever may have been responsible for it.
If that had been all the woman's evidence and it had not gone
farther, surely it would be admissible .... 138
His Honour held, however, that the testimony of the mother that the
accused killed the three later born children was properly received
because of the difficulty which would have been involved in trying
to elicit testimony as to the deaths of the children without receiving
testimony as to the part played by the accused in those deaths.
It is, with respect, suggested that the distinction which His
Honour attempted to draw was in fact misconceived. The relevance,
and the only possible relevance, of the similar fact evidence was
that it tended to show that the accused murdered all four children. If
that was the purpose for which the evidence was adduced, there
could be no objection to direct testimony as to that fact.
In Noor Mohamed v. The King 139 the accused was charged with
the murder of his de facto wife, Ayesha. The case arose in the
Supreme Court of British Guiana. Ayesha had died as a result of
taking potassium cyanide. The accused was a goldsmith, lawfully in
possession of potassium cyanide for the purpose of his business.
The accused was shown to have been on bad terms with Ayesha,
and the prosecution case was that he had either tricked or forced her
into taking the poison. The prosecution was permitted to lead
evidence that two years and four months earlier the accused's wife,
Gooriah, with whom he had also been on bad terms, had also died
as a result of taking potassium cyanide.
The accused was convicted of murder, and appealed to the Privy
Council where the conviction was quashed. Delivering the
judgment of the Privy Council Lord Du Parcq stated:
There can be little doubt that the manner of Ayesha's death, even
without the evidence as to the death of Gooriah, would arouse
suspicion against the appellant in the mind of a reasonable man.
138. [1933] 4 D.L.R. 725 at 730; (1933), 60C.C.C. 153 at 158
139. [1949] A.C. 182
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The facts proved as to the death of Gooriah would certainly tend
to deepen that suspicion, and might well tilt the balance against
the accused in the estimation of a jury. It by no means follows
that this evidence ought to be admitted. If an examination of it
shows that it is impressive just because it appears to demonstrate,
in the words of Lord Herschell in Makin's case "that the accused
is a person likely from his criminal conduct or character to have
committed the offence for which he is being tried", and if it is
otherwise of no real substance, then it was certainly wrongly
admitted. After fully considering all the facts which, if accepted,
it revealed, their Lordships are not satisfied that its admission can
be justified. 140
It is submitted that the Privy Council was correct in this decision,
and that the similar fact evidence was not of sufficient weight to
justify its admission. 141 There were two likely explanations as to the
deaths of the two women. Either they had taken potassium cyanide
by mistake or as a means of suicide, or the accused had murdered
them. 142 In this instance however, the coincidence required for the
first hypothesis to be true was not of a sufficiently high order to
render the evidence admissible. Only two incidents were involved,
and the circumstances of death were not of great peculiarity.
A case perhaps right on the borderline is Harris v. Director of
Public Prosecutions. 143 The accused, a policeman, was charged on
eight counts of larcency from the premises of a company of fruit and
vegetable merchants in the Bradford market. In every case the
money stolen was only a part of the amount that the thief might have
taken; in every case the theft occurred in a period during part of
which the accused was on duty in uniform in the course of patrolling
the market, and apparently at an hour when most of the gates to the
market were closed to the general public. On the first seven of these
occasions there was no further evidence to associate the accused
specifically with the thefts. On the eighth occasion, however, a trap
had been laid. A burglar alarm had been placed on the premises
without the knowledge of the accused, and marked money had been
placed in the cash register. Immediately after the alarm sounded
detectives, who had been lying in wait, ran to the market and saw
140. Id. at 192-3
141. See Rupert Cross, Evidence (4th ed.) supra, note 21 at 312-313. Note also
the remarks of Viscount Simon in Harris v. D.P.P., [1952] A.C. 694 at 708, and
of Owen J. in R. v. Fletcher, [1953] S.R. (N.S.W.) 70 at 79.
142. A third possible hypothesis could have been that the accused killed one
woman but not the other.
143. [1952] A.C. 694
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the accused standing near the premises. He did not approach them
immediately although they were persons with whom he was
acquainted, but he did so after disappearing from sight for a short
period during which he could have placed the marked money in a
bin where it was subsequently found.
The jury acquitted on counts 1 to 7, and convicted on count 8.
The accused appealed unsuccessfully to the Court of Appeal on the
ground that the trial judge had incorrectly directed the jury that they
could take account of the evidence relating to the first seven counts
in considering the eighth count. He then appealed to the House of
Lords, where by a majority of four to one the appeal was allowed
and the accused's conviction quashed. 1 4 The main judgment in the
House of Lords was delivered by Viscount Simon, who stated:
The eighth count raised two issues: (1) Was the money stolen on
July 22? (2) Is it proved that it was the appellant who stole it?
Previous events could not confirm (1), which indeed was proved
beyond dispute. As for (2), the accused denied that he was the
thief and the fact that someone perpetrated the earlier thefts when
the accused may have been somewhere in the market does not
provide material confirmation of his identity as the thief on the
last occasion. The case against him on July 22 depended on the
facts of that date. 145
It is, with respect, submitted that the evidence regarding the first
seven counts in fact possessed considerably more probative value in
relation to the eighth count than the majority of their Lordships were
prepared to accord it. 14 The series of eight thefts were identical in
locality and nature. It was a highly probable, through not a
necessary, inference that they were all committed by the same
person. All eight thefts were carried out on evenings when the
accused was on duty in the market. Two hypotheses could be
adduced to explain this set of facts. Either on eight evenings during
144. Viscount Simon, Lord Porter, Lord Morton of Henryton and Lord Tucker;
Lord Oaksey dissenting
145. [1952] A.C. 694 at 711
146. The decision in Harris v. D.P.P. has generally been approved by
commentators. See Rupert Cross, Evidence (4th ed.) supra, note 21 at 312; Zelman
Cowen and P.B. Carter, "The Admissibility of Evidence of Similar Facts: A
Re-Examination" in Essays on the Law of Evidence supra, note 17 at 123-126; P.
Brett, Abnormal Propensity Or Plain Bad Character? supra note 19 at 478-9. Cf.
R. M. Eggleston, "The Relationship Between Relevance and Admissibility in the
Law of Evidence" in H. H. Glass (ed.), Seminars on Evidence, supra, note 22 at
68-9; RichardEggleston, Evidence, Proof and Probability supra, note 21 at 69-71.
The decision in Harris, v. D.P.P. was construed narrowly by the Court of Appeal
in the recent case ofR. v. Mansfield, [1978] 1 All E.R. 134 at 141-143.
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which the accused was on duty in the market a theft had been carried
out by an unknown person who was seen by no one including the
accused. Alternatively, the accused committed each of the thefts.
When to this is added the fact that the other evidence against the
accused in respect of the eighth count was quite strong, it would
seem that the first hypothesis was a fairly improbable one. It would
appear then that the evidence relating to the first seven counts was
of considerable probative value in respect of the eighth count, and
that the House of Lords may have been unduly favourable to the
accused in holding that it was not admissible for this purpose.
11. Where the Accused is Found in Possession of Incriminating
Material
If the accused is charged with an offence, evidence that he was in
possession of materials of a type often used in the commission of
such an offence is, without more, not sufficiently relevant to be
admissible. Such evidence shows not more than that the accused has
a general propensity to commit offences of the type charged. If,
however, the materials may well have been used in the commission
of the actual crime charged, then the fact that the accused was in
possession of these materials may be of far greater relevance and
therefore admissible.
Illustrative is the Australian case of Thompson v. The Queen. 
147
The two accused were charged with having taken money from two
safes which had been blown open by the use of explosives. The
prosecution was permitted to lead evidence that the accused had in
their possession a collection of tools and implements for the opening
of safes by blowing, by drilling or by picking the locks. The
accused were convicted, and appealed to the High Court where their
convictions were quashed.
The Court held that evidence that the accused had been in
possession of implements which may have been used in the
commission of the crimes charged was properly admitted. In a joint
judgment Barwick C. J. and Menzies J. stated:
We do not think that evidence of the possession of tools for the
147. (1968), 42 A.L.J.R. 16. See also R. v. Ventricini (1910), 17 C.C.C. 183
(Ont.C.A.); Piosko v. The King (1922), 63 S.C.R. 226; 37 C.C.C. 199; R. v.
Manning (1923), 17 Cr. App.Rep. 85; R. v. Taylor (1923), 17 Cr.App.Rep. 109;
R. v. Wurch (1932), 58 C.C.C. 204 (Man. C.A.); Picken v. The King, [1938]
S.C.R. 457; (1938), 69 C.C.C. 321; Driscoll v. The Queen (1977), 51 A.L.J.R.
731. Cf. R. v. Reading (1965), 50 Cr.App.Rep. 98
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commission of crime is admissible only when it appears that tools
of that nature were used in carrying out the alleged crime; it is
sufficient if such tools might have been so used. .. 148
However, evidence that they had been in possession of other tools
for the opening of safes, which tools clearly had not been used in the
commission of the crimes charged, went beyond what was
permissible. Such evidence "did not more than tend to show that
the prisoners were well-equipped safebreakers". 149
The fact that the accused had possession of material similar in
nature to that which may have been used in the commission of the
crime charged is not always of high probative value. It is submitted
that too much significance was placed upon this fact in R. v.
Armstrong. 150 The accused, a solicitor, was charged with the
murder of his wife by administering arsenic to her. It was admitted
that the wife died of arsenic poisoning. The accused's defence was
that he had not administered poison to her, but that she had
committed suicide. The accused had purchased a quantity of arsenic
and made it up into a number of small packets, each containing what
would be a fatal dose. His explanation was that he had purchased it
for use as a weed-killer in his garden.
To rebut this defence, the prosecution was permitted to lead
evidence of an incident occurring eight months after the death of the
wife. The accused was acting for the vendor in a contract for the
sale of land. The purchaser's solicitor had warned him that unless
the contract was concluded by a certain date, the purchaser would
reclaim his deposit. Thereupon the two solicitors met at the
accused's house for tea. The accused handed the other solicitor a
buttered scone, saying "Excuse my fingers." The purchaser's
solicitor became ill shortly afterwards, vomiting copiously. A
sample of his urine revealed arsenic poisoning.
The accused was convicted, and appealed unsuccessfully to the
Court of Criminal Appeal. Delivering the judgment of the Court
Lord Hewart C.J. stated:
[Prior to the death of his wife] the appellant purchased a quarter
of a pound of white arsenic and took it home. With what design
did he make that purchase and provide himself at that particular
time with that poison? Was it for the innocent purpose of
destroying weeds or for the felonious purpose of poisoning his
148. (1968), 42 A.L.J.R. 16at 17
149. Id
150. [1922]2 K.B. 555
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wife? The fact that he was subsequently found not merely in
possession of but actually using for a similar deadly purpose the
very kind of poison that caused the death of his wife was
evidence from which the jury might infer that that poison was not
in his possession at the earlier date for an innocent purpose.
15 1
The evidence of the attempted poisoning of the solicitor showed
no more than that the accused had a propensity for murder by
poisoning. Such a propensity is not sufficiently unusual to render
the evidence admissible. The fact that prior to the death of his wife
the accused purchased arsenic does not appear to add significantly
to the probative value of the similar fact evidence. It is suggested,
therefore, that the similar fact evidence in R. v. Armstrong ought to
have been inadmissible.
12. Where the Evidence is Rendered Admissible by Statute
Statutory provisions render evidence of a similar fact nature
admissible in cases of possession of property obtained by the
commission of a crime. 152 Sections 317 and 318 of the Criminal
Code contain these exceptional provisions. 153 The purpose of these
sections is to make it easier for the prosecution to prove guilty
knowledge in a class of case where such knowledge is often
particularly difficult to establish.
Similar fact evidence is only rendered admissible by virtue of
these provisions where notice is given to the accused that the
evidence is to be tendered. 154 The evidence is admissible only for
the purpose of establishing knowledge on the part of the accused.
IV. The Conduct of the Case
The probative value of an item of similar fact evidence, and
therefore its admissibility, will often depend upon the defence
raised by the accused. In relation to some possible defences the
evidence may be of great probative value and therefore admissible.
In relation to other defences the evidence may be of quite limited
probative value and therefore inadmissible.
The prejudicial potential of similar fact evidence makes it
important that admissibility be confined to cases where the evidence
151. Id at 566
152. Criminal Code ss.312, 314 (1) (b)
153. Note R. v. Bautilier (1968), 4 C.R.N.S. 90 (N.S.Co.Ct.); R. v. Bowins,
(1973), 24 C.R.N.S. 279 (Ont.Co.Ct.)
154. Ss.317(2), 318(2). NoteR. v. Long, [1959] 3 All E.R. 559
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is of high probative value having regard to the issues actually in
dispute between the parties. In Thompson v. The King Lord Sumner
stated:
Before an issue can be said to be raised, which would permit the
introduction of such evidence so obviously prejudicial to the
accused, it must have been raised in substance if not in so many
words, and the issue so raised must be one to which the
prejudicial evidence is relevant. The mere theory that a plea of
not guilty puts everything material in issue is not enough for this
purpose. The prosecution cannot credit the accused with fancy
defences in order to rebut them at the outset with some damning
piece of prejudice.1
55
It will be sufficient to give several illustrations of this point. In
Perkins v. Jeffrey 156 the accused was charged with indecently
exposing himself to a certain Miss T. The prosecution wished to call
other women to testify that on previous occasions the accused had
exposed himself to them. The Divisional Court held that the
relevance of this evidence, and therefore its admissibility, depended
upon the defence raised by the accused. If the accused's defence
was that he had not exposed himself wilfully or with intent to insult
Miss T, the evidence would be admissible as rendering such a
defence highly improbable. If, however, the accused's defence was
one of mistaken identity by Miss T, the evidence would not be of
sufficient probative value to justify admissibility.
In R. v. Rodley' 57 the accused was charged with breaking and
entering with intent to rape. The evidence for the prosecution was to
the effect that the accused broke into the house between midnight
and 1 a.m., that the prosecutrix, hearing a noise, came downstairs,
when the accused seized her and pulled up her clothes. At this point
the woman's father came downstairs, and the accused fled. The
accused's defence was that he had gone to the house for the purpose
of courting the prosecutrix with her consent, that he did not break
into the house and did not intend or attempt to rape her. The
prosecution tendered evidence that at about 2 a.m. on the same
morning the accused went to the house of another woman, about
155. [19181 A.C. 221 at 232 This view was contradicted by Lord Goddard C.J. in
R. v. Sims, [1946] K.B. 531 at 539, but affirmed by the Privy Council in Noor
Mohamed v. The King, [1949] A.C. 182 at 191-192, and by the House of Lords in
Harris v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1952] A.C. 694 at 706-707. Note also
R. v. Hall, [195211 K.B. 302 and 307
156. [1915] 2 K.B. 702. Note also R. v. Williams (1977), 25 C.C.C. 103
(Ont.G.S.)
157. [1913]3 K.B. 468
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three miles from the prosecutrix's house. He gained access to her
bedroom down the chimney and, with her consent, they had sexual
intercourse.
The accused was convicted and appealed to the Court of Criminal
Appeal. The Court held that the similar fact evidence ought not to
have been admitted.
Had the accused's defence been a complete denial of the incident,
the similar fact evidence would have been admissible in order to
show that at the time in question he was in a lustful state and
prepared to break into dwelling places in order to satisfy that lust.
However, the accused's defence was that he had entered the first
house not with intent to commit rape, but with intent to have
voluntary intercourse. Evidence that shortly afterwards he entered
another house where he succeeded in his aim was of little if any
relevance in order to rebut this defence.
InR. v. Campbell158 the accused was charged with performing an
unlawful abortion. His defence was a denial that he had performed
any operation on the woman. Evidence that the accused had
performed abortions upon other women was admitted by the trial
judge, and the accused was convicted. On appeal to the Court of
Appeal for British Columbia the accused's conviction was quashed
by a majority of three to two. 159 The majority took the view that had
the accused admitted operating upon the woman, but denied that the
operation performed was an unlawful abortion, the similar fact
evidence would have been admissible. The evidence would have
been relevant as rendering a defence of lack of intent highly
improbable. However, in the context of a defence that the accused
was not the person who had performed the abortion, the similar fact
evidence was not of sufficient probative value to justify
admissibility.
The prosecution is not obliged to wait until the accused makes his
defence known before leading similar fact evidence. The
prosecution may conduct its case on the basis that the accused is
going to take all defences reasonably open. Where, however, in
cross examination of a prosecution witness or in some other way, it
158. [19471 1 D.L.R. 904; (1946), 86 C.C.C. 410. See also R. v. Anderson,
[1935] 4 D.L.R. 32; (1935), 64 C.C.C. 205 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Hrechuk (1950), 98
C.C.C. 44 (Man.C.A.); R. v. Ross (1958), 121 C.C.C. 284 (B.C.C.A.). Note also
the recent case of R. v. Doubrough (1977), 35 C.C.C. 46 (Ont. C.C.), where the
defence raised by the accused rendered damaging similar fact evidence admissible.
159. Sloan C.J., Robertson and Sidney Smith JJ.A.; O'Halloran and Bird JJ.A.
dissenting
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becomes clear that certain defences are not being taken by the
accused, the prosecution ought not be permitted to lead similar fact
evidence admissible only to rebut those defences. In Harris v.
Director of Public Prosecutions Viscount Simon stated:
The substance of the matter appears to me to be that the
prosecution may adduce all proper evidence which tends to prove
the charge. I do not understand Lord Herschell's words [in Makin
v. Attorney-General for New South Wales] to mean that the
prosecution must withhold such evidence until after the accused
has set up a specific defence which calls for rebuttal. Where, for
instance, mens rea is an essential element in guilt, and the facts
of the occurrence which is the subject of the charge, standing by
themselves, would be consistent with mere accident, there would
be nothing wrong in the prosecution seeking to establish the true
situation by offering, as part of its case in the first instance,
evidence of similar action by the accused at another time which
would go to show that he intended to do what he did on the
occasion charged and was thus acting criminally . . . . What
Lord Sumner meant when he denied the right of the prosecution
to "credit the accused with fancy defences" (in Thompson v. The
King) was that evidence of similar facts involving the accused
ought not to be dragged in to his prejudice without reasonable
cause. 1
60
In some jurisdictions the sensible rule has been adopted that, in
cases of doubt, the trial judge should ask the accused or his counsel,
in the absence of the jury, to indicate whether he proposes to take
the defence which the similar fact evidence will be admissible to
rebut. 161
It is submitted that the above principles were misapplied by the
Supreme Court of Canada in Leblanc v. The Queen. 162 The accused
was charged with criminal negligence causing death. 163 He was a
bush pilot, and was to pick up the deceased and his companion. The
accused, in order to frighten the men on the ground as a joke,
intended to make a "pass" at them; that is, to fly very low over
them. He miscalculated, flew too low and the plane hit and killed
160. [1952] A.C. 694 at 706-7. See also R. v. Rogans (1916), 35 N.Z.L.R. 265 at
304; R. v. Anderson, [1935] 4 D.L.R. 32; (1935), 64 C.C.C. 205 (B.C.C.A.);
Noor Mohamed v. The King, [1949] A.C. 182 at 191-2; R. v. Miller, [1951]
V.L.R. 346 at 353; R. v. Thompson (1954), 107 C.C.C. 373 (Ont.H.C.); R. v.
Cline (1956), 115 C.C.C. 18 (Ont.C.A.); Leblanc v. The Queen (1975), 29 C.C.C.
97 at 103-5 (S.C.C.)
161. R. v. Yuille, [1948] V.L.R. 41 at 46. See alsoR. v. Horry, [1949] N.Z.L.R.
791 at 798-9
162. (1975), 29C.C.C. 97
163. Criminal Code s.203
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the deceased. The weather conditions were ideal at the time and the
mechanical fitness of the airplane was established. The accused
testified and admitted that he was making a "pass".
The prosecution as part of its case was allowed to prove that in
the several weeks preceding the fatal "pass" the accused had made
three other low "passes", twice over persons standing on the
ground and once over persons sitting in a boat. The accused was
convicted and appealed unsuccessfully to the Court of Appeal of
Quebec. He then appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.
By a majority of six to three the Supreme Court held the evidence
was properly admitted and dismissed the accused's appeal. 1 6 4 The
majority held the similar fact evidence was admissible to establish
guilty intent, i.e. to preclude any possible defence that mechanical
failure or some other factor beyond the control of the accused
caused the aircraft's sudden descent.
The main judgment of the minority was delivered by Dickson J.
His Honour stated:
Evidence of other offences is admissible to negative a defence of
innocent intent or accident only if such a defence is raised by an
accused or it can be said from the facts of the case that such a
defence was rationally open to the accused. 1
65
His Honour further stated:
I do not think the evidence of similar acts introduced in this case
was admissible on the ground suggested or on any other ground.
The accused did not intend to kill [the deceased] or to cause him
bodily harm, otherwise he would have faced a murder charge. He
intended to make a "pass" with the aircraft; his real intent, his
identity and the actus reus were never in doubt or an issue. There
was nothing in the evidence . . . to suggest mechanical failure or
aircraft defect which might support a defence of accident. The
aircraft was inspected two days later and found to be in good
flying condition. In these circumstances, I incline to the view,
with great respect, that the Judge should have awaited some
intimation that accident was going to be raised as a ground of
defence before admitting similar fact evidence to rebut a possible
but improbable defence of accident. 166
It is submitted that the view of the minority in Leblanc v. The
Queen is preferable to that of the majority. It is, with respect,
suggested that the case constitutes an example of "credit[ing] the
164. de Grandpr6, Martland, Judson, Ritchie, Spence and Pigeon JJ.; Dickson J.,
Laskin C.J. and Breetz J. dissenting
165. (1975), 29 C.C.C. 97 at 103
166. Id. at 104-5.
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accused with fancy defences in order to rebut them at the outset with
some damning piece of prejudice". 167
It is submitted that none of the above is in any way affected by
s.582 of the Criminal Code and the decision of the Supreme Court
of Canada in Castellani v. The Queen. 168 The accused was charged
with the murder of his wife. It was established that her death was
caused by arsenical poisoning, and that she had ingested quantities
of arsenic throughout a period of several months prior to her death.
The prosecution's case was that the accused had murdered his wife
in order to be free to marry a woman with whom he was having an
adulterous relationship. The first day of the trial, after the evidence
of one prosecution witness had been heard, counsel for the accused
tendered a formal written admission of facts and asked that this be
received pursuant to s.582 of the Criminal Code. That section
provides:
Where an accused is on trial for an indictable offence he or his
counsel may admit any fact alleged against him for the purpose of
dispensing with proof thereof.
The prosecution objected to the inclusion of an admission by the
accused of his adulterous relationship. The trial judge decided not to
permit the admission of this fact. The prosecution was thus free to
adduce evidence to prove the adulterous relationship. The accused
was convicted and appealed. The Court of Appeal for British
Columbia held that the trial judge should have permitted the
admission, but that the error had caused no prejudice to the accused
and that no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice had occurred.
The accused then appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.
The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the trial judge, and
dismissed the accused's appeal. The Court held that s.582 gives the
accused no right to make admissions of fact. Delivering the
judgment of the Court Cartwright C.J. stated:
When recourse is proposed to be had to s.582 it is for the Crown,
not for the defence, to state the fact or facts which it alleges
against the accused and of which it seeks admission. The
accused, of course, is under no obligation to admit the fact so
alleged but his choice is to admit it or to decline to do so. He
cannot frame the wording of the allegation to suit his own
purposes and then insist on admitting it. "169
167. Thompson v. The King, supra, note 155
168. [1970] S.C.R. 310; [1970]4 CCC. 287
169. Id. at 315 [1970]4 C.C.C. at 290
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Castellani v. The Queen was, of course, a case dealing with
s.582 of the Criminal Code. Thus it cannot be treated as affecting
the common law principle that the relevance, and therefore the
admissibility, of evidence for the prosecution may be dependent
upon the manner in which the defence is conducted. Further, the
evidence it was sought to keep out by the making of the admission
in Castellani v. The Queen was not similar fact evidence. It was
circumstantial evidence directed to showing that the accused had a
motive for the murder of his wife. The case therefore should not be
regarded as involving any modification of the ordinary rules relating
to the admissibility of similar fact evidence.
V. The Discretion to Exclude
In this article the argument has been put forward that in applying
Lord Herschell's formulation in Makin v. Attorney-Generalfor New
South Wales the courts are in fact engaged in a process of balancing
probative value against risk of prejudice. If this view were to be
expressly adopted by the courts, then in the field of similar fact
evidence there would be no real scope for the operation of a general
judicial discretion to exclude legally admissible evidence. The
considerations which govern the exercise of such a judicial
discretion would be fully dealt with in the context of legal
admissibility.
However, in determining whether similar fact evidence is
admissible or not, the courts do not generally see themselves as
balancing probative value against the risk of prejudice. Rather they
see themselves as merely applying the rule laid down in Makin v.
Attorney-General for New South Wales, and in general this means
determining whether the evidence fits within a recognised category
of admissibility. If the evidence can be treated as fitting within such
a category it will generally, subject to the judicial discretion to
exclude, he held admissible. So long as the courts continue to
understand the principle of Makin v. Attorney-General for New
South Wales in terms of a rule which needs merely to be applied to
the facts of the instant case, it is highly important that a
discretionary power to exclude similar fact evidence be retained and
acted upon. If this is not done, a literal application of the rule may
on occasion result in the admission of evidence of limited probative
value but high prejudice.
The existence of a general judicial discretion to exclude similar
342 The Dalhousie Law Journal
fact evidence legally admissible is well recognised in England. In
Noor Mohamed v. The King Lord du Parcq stated:
• . . in all such cases the judge ought to consider whether the
evidence which it is proposed to adduce is sufficiently
substantial, having regard to the purpose to which it is
professedly directed, to make it desirable in the interest of justice
that it should be admitted. If, so far as that purpose is concerned,
it can in the circumstances of the case have only trifling weight,
the judge will be right to exclude it. To say this is not to confuse
weight with admissibility. The distinction is plain, but cases must
occur in which it would be unjust to admit evidence of a character
gravely prejudicial to the accused even though there may be some
tenuous ground for holding it technically admissible. The
decision must then be left to the discretion and the sense of
fairness of the judge. 170
In Harris v. Director of Public Prosecutions Viscount Simon stated:
This . . . proposition flows from the duty of the judge when
trying a charge of crime to set the essentials of justice above the
technical rule if the strict application of the latter would operate
unfairly against the accused. If such a case arose, the judge may
intimate to the prosecution that evidence of "similar facts"
affecting the accused, though admissible, should not be pressed
because its probable effect 'would be out of proportion to its true
evidential value' (per Lord Moulton in Director of Public
Prosecutions v. Christie). Such an intimation rests entirely
within the discretion of the judge.
171
In Canada, any discussion of judicial discretion must now centre
upon the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Wray. 1
72
The accused was charged with non-capital murder. He made a
confession to the police which was clearly involuntary, and
therefore inadmissible. The accused told the police that he had
thrown the murder weapon into a swamp, and led them to a spot
where the rifle which had killed the deceased was discovered. The
trial judge refused to allow the prosecution to adduce evidence of
the part played by the accused in the discovery of the murder
weapon. The accused was acquitted, and the prosecution appealed.
The Ontario Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the trial judge.
170. [1949]A.C. 182 at 192
171. [1952] A.C. 694 at 707. See alsoR. v. Fitzpatrick, [1962] 3 A11'E.R. 840;R.
v. Tait, [1963] V.R. 520 at 524;R. v. Doyle, [1967] V.R. 698; Selvey v. Director
of Public Prosecutions, [1970] A.C. 304 at 341-342, 358, 360. Cf. Bernard
Livesey, Judicial Discretion to Exclude Prejudicial Evidence [1968] C.L.J. 291.
172. [1971] S.C.R. 272; (1970), 11 D.L.R. (3d) 673
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The judgment of the Court was delivered by Aylesworth J.A., who
stated:
In our view, a trial Judge has a discretion to reject evidence, even
of substantial weight, if he considers that its admission would be
unjust or unfair to the accused or calculated to bring the
administration of justice into disrepute, the exercise of such
discretion, of course, to depend upon the particular facts before
him. Cases where to admit certain evidence would be calculated
to bring the administration of justice into disrepute will be rare,
but we think the discretion of a trial Judge extends to such
cases. 173
The prosecution when appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.
By a majority of six to three the Court allowed the appeal and
directed a new trial.1 74 Both the majority and the minority were of
the view that, as a matter of law, the finding of the gun and the part
played by the accused in its discovery were admissible. The case
turned on the scope of the trial judge's discretion to disallow legally
admissible evidence.
The leading judgment of the minority was delivered by
Cartwright C.J.C. Adopting the reasoning of the Ontario Court of
Appeal, His Honour stated:
The confession of the accused was improperly obtained and was
rightly excluded as being involuntary. In spite of this, evidence
of the fact that the accused told the police where the murder
weapon could be found was legally admissible under the rule in
R. v. St. Lawrence, but because the manner in which he was
induced to indicate the location of the weapon was as
objectionable as that in which he was induced to make the
confession, it was open to the learned trial Judge to hold that the
admission of evidence of that fact would be so unjust and unfair
to the accused and so calculated to bring the administration of
justice-into disrepute as to warrant his rejecting the evidence in
the exercise of his discretion; and, finally, there being evidence
on which it was open to the learned trial Judge to exercise his
discretion in the way he did, the propriety of that exercise is not
open to review on an appeal by the Crown. 17
5
The leading judgment of the majority was delivered by Martland
J. In what has become a celebrated passage, His Honour stated:
The allowance of admissible evidence relevant to the issue before
173. [1970] 3 C.C.C. 122 at 123
174. The majority comprised Martland, Judson, Ritchie, Pigeon, Fauteaux and
Abbott JJ.; Cartwright C.J., Spence and Hall JJ. dissented.
175. [1971] S.C.R. 272 at 286-7; (1970), 11 D.L.R. (3d) 673 at 684-5
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the Court and of substantial probative value may operate
unfortunately for the accused, but not unfairly. It is only the
allowance of evidence gravely prejudicial to the accused, the
admissibility of which is tenuous, and whose probative force in
relation to the main issue before the Court is trifling, which can
be said to operate unfairly.
176
Referring to two cases in which the English Court of Appeal held
that improperly obtained evidence ought to have been rejected by
the trial judge, 177 His Honour stated:
In cases such as R. v. Court and R. v. Payne, I think confusion
has arisen between "unfairness" in the method of obtaining
evidence, and 'unfairness' in the actual trial of the accused by
reason of its admission. . . . The view which they express would
replace the Noor Mohamed test, based on the duty of a trial Judge
to ensure that the minds of the jury be not prejudiced by evidence
of little probative value, but of great prejudicial effect, by the test
as to whether evidence, the probative value of which is
unimpeachable, was obtained by methods which the trial Judge,
in his own discretion, considers to be unfair. Exclusion of
evidence on this ground has nothing whatever to do with the duty
of a trial Judge to secure a fair trial for the accused. 17
8
His Honour concluded:
In my opinion, the recognition of a discretion to exclude
admissible evidence, beyond the limited scope recognized in the
Noor Mohamed case, is not warranted by authority, and would be
undesirable. The admission of relevant admissible evidence of
probative value should not be prevented, except within the very
limited sphere recognized in that case. My view is that the trial
Judge's discretion does not extend beyond those limits, and,
accordingly, I think, with respect, that the definition of that
discretion by the Court of Appeal in this case was wrong in
law. 179
The decision in R. v. Wray has been the subject of a great deal of
controversy. 180 It is not proposed in this article to enter into the
debate over the conflicting philosophies expressed by the Ontario
Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada. It is submitted,
however, that the decision of the Supreme Court in no way affects
176. Id. at 293 (1970), 11 D.L.R. (3d) at 689-90
177. R. v. Court, [1962] Crim.L.R. 697;R. v. Payne, [196311 W.L.R. 637
178. [1971] S.C.R. 272 at 295; (1970), 11 D.L.R. (3d) 673 at 691
179. Id. at 295-6 (1970), 11 D.L.R. (3d) at 691-2
180. Note in particular the criticisms in the Ontario Law Reform Commission's
Report on the Law of Evidence, ch.5. Cf. M.S. Weinberg, The Judicial Discretion
to Exclude Relevant Evidence (1975), 21 McGill Law Journal 1
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the discretion of the trial judge to reject legally admissible similar
fact evidence.
There is a clear distinction between the exercise of a discretion
with respect to evidence which was obtained improperly before the
trial, and the exercise of a discretion with respect to evidence
which, although obtained in an entirely proper manner, would be
extremely prejudicial to the accused if admitted during the course of
the trial. 18 ' Indeed, this distinction formed a cornerstone of the
reasoning of the majority in R. v. Wray. R. v. Wray is authority for
the proposition that the trial judge is not entitled to reject evidence
of the former class on the grounds that to admit it would "bring the
administration of justice into disrepute". 182 Nothing in R. v. Wray
curtails the discretion of the trial judge to reject prejudicial evidence
where to do so is necessary in order to ensure that the accused
receives a fair trial. It is submitted therefore, that when properly
understood R. v. Wray leaves untouched the discretion of the trial
judge to reject legally admissible similar fact evidence where the
prejudicial potential of such evidence is out of proportion to its
probative value.
In subsequent cases however, the view has been expressed that R.
v. Wray involves a significant narrowing of the trial judge's
discretion to reject similar fact evidence.
R. v. Glynn has already been discussed in detail. 183 The accused
was charged with murder. There was evidence to suggest that the
deceased may have been murdered by a homosexual. The trial judge
admitted in evidence proof that the accused had engaged in
homosexual acts in previous occasions. The Ontario Court of
Appeal held that such evidence was properly admitted. On the
question of discretion the Court simply quoted the key passage from
the judgment of Martland J. in R. v. Wray, 184 and stated:
It is perfectly apparent to us the admissibility of this evidence is
not tenuous and the probative force of this evidence in relation to
the main issue before the Court cannot by any stretch of the
imagination he described as trifling. '8 5
It has been shown that the evidence in R. v. Glynn was of quite
limited probative value. On the other hand, it was undoubtedly
181. See Rupert Cross, Evidence (4th ed.) supra, note 21 at 27-30.
182. Supra, note 173
183. Supra, p. 345
184. Supra. note 176
185. (1971), 5 S.C.C. (2d) 364 at 366
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evidence with a high potential for prejudice. It is submitted that as a
matter of law, and certainly in the exercise of the trial judge's
discretion, the evidence ought to have been rejected.
In R. v. McDonald186 the accused was charged with the murder
of his mistress. She had been found beaten to death. The accused's
defence was that she had been killed by someone else. The victim's
son gave evidence that during the time the accused had lived with
him and his mother, the accused had fought with and severely
beaten his mother over a hundred times, usually when one or both of
them were intoxicated. The accused was convicted of manslaughter
and appealed unsuccessfully to the Ontario Court of Appeal. The
judgment of the Court was delivered by Arnup J.A., who stated:
As I have indicated, counsel suggested that the evidence was so
obviously prejudicial that the trial Judge had a discretion to
exclude it. It is clear from the English cases that such discretion
has a much wider ambit in England than it now has in Canada
since the judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada in Wray v.
The Queen, [1970] 4 C.C.C. 1, 11 D.L.R. (3d) 673, [1971]
S.C.R. 272. The admissibility of this evidence was not
"tenuous", nor was its probative value "slight" (both terms
being those used by Martland, J., in Wray). Accordingly, the
trial Judge was right in not exercising the discretion it is said that
he had to exclude it. 187
Clearly the evidence was admissible as bearing on the
relationship between the accused and the victim. 188 Equally, since
the evidence was of high probative value the trial judge was correct
in not exercising his discretion to exclude it. It is unfortunate,
however, that the Court saw fit to suggest that R. v. Wray has led to
a narrowing of the trial judge's discretion to reject similar fact
evidence. It is submitted that on the facts of R. v. McDonald an
English Court would have reached the same result as did the Ontario
Court of Appeal.
It is submitted that there is no warrant for the view that the
discretion of the trial judge to reject similar fact evidence is
narrower in Canada than in England. R. v. Wray is certainly no
authority for such a proposition.
VI. Conclusion
The approach taken in this article to the admissibility of similar fact
186. (1974), 20 C.C.C. (2d) 144
187. Id. at 154
188. Supra, p. 346
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evidence has been to focus upon the interaction of the two factors of
probative value and risk of prejudice. Traditional accounts of the
operation of the rule in Makin v. Attorney-General of New South
Wales concentrate either upon questions of classification or upon
the distinction between relevance via propensity and relevance other
than via propensity. It has been argued that such approaches tend to
place insufficient emphasis upon the factors which in reality
determine the admissibility of similar fact evidence. Traditional
categories certainly draw attention to areas in which similar fact
evidence is often of sufficiently high probative value to justify
admissibility. Likewise the distinction between relevance other than
via propensity and relevance via propensity separates in a rough and
ready fashion classes of case where similar fact evidence is often
admissible from classes of case where it is often inadmissible.
However, it is maintained that any satisfactory account of the law
relating to the admissibility of similar fact evidence must treat the
issues of probative value and risk of prejudice as the key issues, in
comparison with which other factors are to be regarded as largely
incidental.
The aim of the present article has been to provide such an
account. A set of headings has been utilized, not as a key to
admissibility, but merely to conveniently group together types of
case in which the probative value of similar fact evidence is often
sufficient to justify admissibility. It is a mistake to think that any set
of categories or distinctions can give a clear indication of when
similar fact evidence will be admissible.
It may be readily conceded that neither probative value nor risk of
prejudice can be measured with any degree of exactitude. The
potential for prejudice possessed by an item of evidence is often
largely a matter of guesswork. The probative value of an item of
evidence is often equally difficult to estimate, and is dependent
upon a large number of variables. In the present context the key
variables are the nature of the similar fact evidence itself, the issues
in contest in the case, and the other evidence presented in the case.
In many of the cases which have been considered, a slight variation
in the facts would have led to a different result.
Precise predictability cannot, of course, be expected in an area in
which basic policy considerations compete. It is submitted that
similar fact evidence is such an area, and that it is a mistake to
attempt to solve the question of admissibility by reliance upon any
simple verbal formula or set of distinctions. What is needed is a
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clear recognition of the competing policies, coupled with a
willingness to attempt the difficult task of evaluating the probative
value and the potential for prejudice possessed by the evidence.**
** I am grateful to Professor P.L. Waller of Monash University for reading this
article, and for his comments and criticisms.
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